

















GENL OGLETHORPE

*General Oglethorpe*

*of Georgia*



**COLLECTIONS**  
**OF THE**  
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“ THE SPANISH OFFICIAL ACCOUNT  
OF THE ATTACK ON THE COLONY OF GEORGIA,  
IN AMERICA, AND OF ITS DEFEAT ON ST. SIMONS ISLAND ”  
BY  
GENERAL JAMES OGLETHORPE

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## PREFACE

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The translation that follows was made from manuscripts in the library of Mr. W. J. DeRenne, copied from the original documents preserved in the Archives of the Indies at Seville. Each of these manuscripts bears a heading giving the provenance of its original, and each is further certified as being a true copy. Heading and certificate are reproduced with the first document of the translation, but it has not been thought worth while to repeat them with the remainder.

The papers of this collection fall more or less naturally into groups:—Letters and orders, diaries, reports and returns. The list of sea- and shore-signals, and one set of naval instructions, have with the returns been placed last as being somewhat detached, logically, from the substance of the other papers. They have their significance and interest, however, in that they reveal the extreme care bestowed on the expedition. It will be noticed that the list of signals and the set of naval instructions relate to an earlier expedition, planned but not carried out.

The sketches of guns and mortars are due to Lieutenant J. W. Lang, 9th Regiment of Infantry, United States Army. They are reproduced from illustrations in the catalogue of the Artillery Museum at Madrid.

The Treaty of Vienna, November 18, 1738, gave Spain but a short respite from war. Claims and counterclaims arising chiefly out of colonial questions, led to much diplomatic parleying with England, and in January, 1739, she saw herself obliged to pay that country an indemnity of £95,000. On the presentation of a demand for a counter-indemnity, England threatened war; on August 20th authorized reprisals, and finally on October 30, 1739, declared war. It is of this war, terminated by the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, October 18, 1748, that the events of the following pages form a part.

War or no war, the Spanish had long been contemplating an expedition against the English Colony of Georgia. They kept such an expedition on the stocks, as it were, to

be launched when opportune; and finally did launch it in June of 1742 to overwhelm the English King's new Colony "in the place called Georgia." To the King of Spain, and to his subjects in Cuba and Florida, the chief object was punitive: the insolent and perfidious English were to be chastised and the chastisement was to be extermination. There was no notion of conquest; once the object attained and the English swept off the face of the earth, troops and ships were to return to their respective garrisons in St. Augustine and Havana. So much stress, indeed, was laid on this withdrawal as to justify the belief that its accomplishment was almost as much a matter of concern as the advance itself. This concern undeniably affected the morale of the commanding general, if not of the entire expedition.

In forming an estimate of the events dealt with in the following pages, it is needful to place one's self in a proper point of view. If we place ourselves abroad, the events are inconspicuous; if we recross the Atlantic, they loom large. In reality, we must not regard the attempt of Spain on New Georgia as an affair between small numbers in a distant and unimportant land; it was Spain and England striving for mastery in a vast continent, and although Spain, as already said, had no notion of conquest, to England, that is to Oglethorpe, the notion of permanency was ever present and fundamentally real. To him the question was whether his beloved Georgia should be a Spanish waste, or a living, free, English colony, a potential State. How he answered this question we all know: he brought to naught as grave a danger as ever threatened the Colonies, and he did it alone.

The point of view must needs then be local, but with a national outlook; it follows that the papers in this collection acquire a double interest. And this interest grows with the conviction, begot of an examination of the records, that Oglethorpe by all the rules of the game, should have been beaten. He was out-manned, out-shipped, and out-gunned. But he was a soldier, and knew his business; although men, and ships, and guns are necessary, alone they are not sufficient. They must first be welded into a homogeneous instrument and then intelligently used, before positive results can be expected. This homogeneity was lacking to his adversaries, a fact that he must have been acquainted with; moreover, they had not had time to know their commander, Montiano, nor he his troops. And lastly, it is in the highest degree probable that Oglethorpe had measured his antagonist.

That Montiano had failed to take his own measure, is proved by his pitiable report to his King. Without in the least intending it, in complete unconsciousness, he strips his own inefficiency bare for our inspection and examination. Psychologically, conditions were against the Spaniards from the outset, but this must not in the least be taken to detract from Oglethorpe: he had to reckon on the one hand with a force much greater than any he could muster, and on the other hand, with certain possibilities in his favor; but in respect of these he might very easily have been in error.

The Spaniards sailed into St. Simons gallantly enough, and landed their men between the forts and the town of Frederica. No resistance was offered. Bearing in mind that a landing under fire is, for the landing party, a delicate operation, we may well ask why Oglethorpe should have neglected this opportunity to do his adversary a serious harm. But a little reflection will show that this case really offered no opportunity. As soon as it became evident that the run-past of the ships was, or would be, successful, the evacuation of the forts was imposed. To leave troops in the forts, even if they could have held out, was folly so clear that we need waste no time over the matter. But once withdrawn, where should they go? Should they proceed to resist this disembarkation, either alone, or in junction with other forces brought down for the purpose?

But Oglethorpe could not tell where the Spaniards would land: it was not inconceivable that they would deliver their first attack on the town itself. If, however, they should choose to land between the town and the forts, then it was the part of wisdom to leave them to follow this course; for once ashore, they would have miles of swamp to cross before reaching him, and his inferiority in numbers would be more than compensated by the advantage of positions selected in advance. If he had attempted to oppose this landing, he would have had the morasses at his back, and so in case of check, have converted an admirable natural defence into a most serious obstacle to successful withdrawal. Moreover, so few were his men that he could not afford to divide them; and lastly, and quite apart from any other consideration, he had no guns to oppose to the Spanish naval artillery, against which any musketry fire that he could bring to bear, ineffective in those days beyond two hundred yards, would have been powerless.

The issue proved the wisdom of his dispositions. The first attempt of the Spaniards to push their way through the morasses was also their last, nor did they later make any

effort of any other sort. This failure to undertake anything more must be regarded as discreditable to the "glory and reputation of the arms of the King," particularly if the Spanish account of losses be correct. That it is not, we know from other sources. Indeed, so great were Montiano's losses, and among his best troops, so sudden and unexpected his check, so uncompromising his defeat, that the matter was really then and there settled. In plain English, he had no stomach for further business. After that disastrous beating when his grenadiers fell only to incarnadine the waters of the swamp in which they were entrapped, he sent out only Indians to see "if they could find some other road to Frederica". Meanwhile his rations were being reduced, he had not got his guns ashore, and rumors unnerved him. In these straits he fell to calling councils of war and so was lost. That he had made only one genuine effort to reach his objective, that in spite of the failure of this effort, he still outnumbered Oglethorpe, that in any case his fleet was substantially intact, these things made no impression on him. His one concern was to withdraw. And yet so blind was he to his own shortcomings that he attributes his failure to the Almighty and actually asks his King to approve his conduct of affairs and to bestow honors upon him. To be sure, he had razed a few earthworks evacuated by their garrisons, carried off a few guns spiked by the enemy, burned a few houses abandoned by the inhabitants. And here we may now well leave him, recounting his victories over inanimate things, and glossing his failure, for this failure made the State of Georgia possible.

C. DeW. W.

West Point, New York, October 19, 1912.





Note: The latitude shows the South: N & S, and is correct. There is no E & W Scale

This map reproduced from the original in the possession of W. J. DeBeane, Wormsloe, Ga.



GENERAL ARCHIVES OF THE INDIES: AUDIENCE OF  
SAN DOMINGO, LOUISIANA AND FLORIDA.

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Report Upon the Expulsion of the English from the Territories  
They Have Usurped in Florida, and Survey of Limits and  
Incidences. From 1738 to 1743; Case 87, Drawer 1, File 3.

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Affidavit of Juan Castelnau, a Prisoner in Georgia.

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Havana, July 24, 1739.\*

Don Juan Francisco de Guemes y Horcasitas transmits the depositions made by Juan Castelnau, a native of Los Pasages in Guipúzcoa, on the present state of the Settlements of New Georgia, where he was held a prisoner for 18 months, and of its fortifications, forces and establishments.

Sir: Juan Castelnau, who says he is a native of Los Pasages in Guipúzcoa, having come from Cartagena in this dispatch boat now on her way to those kingdoms [i. e. Castile and Leon, or Spain] with the order and permission consisting in a decree petitioned for by him of Lieutenant General Don Blas de Lesso, I have taken the declarations that follow to substantiate the reasons he gave to obtain the said permission. As I find from them that he has told the truth, and given an exact account and trustworthy news of the state of the towns of New Georgia, its fortifications, forces and establishments, both as these were at the time of the expedition intended and planned for the past year of 1738, and as they were after the arrival of the Commanding General Don Diego Oglethorpe,\*\* I have thought it proper to send your Lordship the testimony of his declarations, to the end that His Majesty may be thoroughly informed of past and present conditions, because it agrees with all the inquiries and news which I had made and acquired for the expedition, and with those of the Governor of Saint Augustine in

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\* It should be recollected that these dates are Gregorian; those of the contemporaneous English accounts are Julian. The difference, as is well known, was at this epoch, eleven days.

\*\* Oglethorpe's name has in all cases, been left exactly as the Spaniards wrote it.

Florida, made after the return of Don Diego Ogletorp to those Colonies.

God keep your Lordship many years.

Havana, July 24, 1739.

Your most obedient servant kisses your hand.

Don Juan Francisco de Guemes y Horcasitas.

To Señor Don Joseph de la Quintana.

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### DECLARATION.

In the city of Havana, on the 18th day of July, 1739, Don Juan Francisco de Guemes y Horcasitas, Field Marshal of the Armies of His Majesty, his Governor and Captain General over the said city and of the Island of Cuba, said:— That the day before yesterday, the 16th of the current month, there came into this port [Havana] from that of Cartagena of the Indies, the dispatch frigate on her way to the kingdom of Castile and aboard of her, Juan Castelnau, a native of Los Pasages in the Province of Guipúzcoa, who was for 18 months a prisoner in New Georgia and other settlements, which the English have occupied; and that upon his liberation, he succeeded in passing through Virginia and other parts to the city of Santo Domingo in the island of Hispaniola, and thence to Cartagena aforesaid. Here he presented himself to His Excellency Don Blas de Leso,\* Lieutenant General of His Majesty's fleets, Commander of the Galleons there stationed, and of all the naval forces in America, who upon request ordered him to proceed here in the dispatch frigate. In order now to possess ourselves of all that he has seen, surveyed, and understood, let him appear forthwith, and under oath, clearly and distinctly set forth the matter, according to the questions that may be made to him. And by these presents, I so provide, command and sign.

Guemes.

Before me, Miguel de Ayala,

Chief Clerk, State and War.

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\* Leso, or Lezo, is mentioned by Altamira (*Historia de España*, Vol. IV., p. 194) as one of the celebrated Spanish seamen of the time.

*Declaration of Juan Castelnau.*

His Lordship, the Governor and Captain General immediately caused Juan Castelnau, a native of Los Pasages, to appear before him, who being sworn before God and on the Cross according to law, promised in consequence to tell the truth, whereupon the following questions were put to him:

Asked why he had come to this place in the dispatch boat that had anchored in its port, the 16th instant, on its way from Cartagena to Spain, he said, that finding himself in Cartegena, he had asked permission of His Excellency Don Blas de Leso, Lieutenant General of the Fleets of His Majesty, Commander of the Galleons in that port, and of all the naval forces in America, to go to Havana and make report to His Lordship of the state of the Colonies of New Georgia in which the English had kept him a prisoner for 18 months, as appears from the petition which he presented to the said Don Blas de Leso and from his decree in evidence. Asked why and when he had been apprehended by the English of the Colonies of New Georgia, where he declared he had been, he answered that it was because they took him for a spy of Spain, and that it was in the beginning of the year 1737 on passing from Florida to Carolina, when he was examined by two tribunals; that after two months of confinement on account of said suspicion, the tribunals finding him guiltless, had enlarged him.

Asked how he had passed from Florida to Carolina, and for what reason he was in Florida, he said he had gone from Pensacola, where he had assisted the paymaster of that post, to Florida with the idea of crossing Carolina on his way to Europe in order to return to his own country, and that to that end he had received authority from the Governor of Saint Augustine in Florida, who was then Don Francisco del Moral Sánchez, to make a journey through Carolina.

Asked where he had been after being set at liberty in Carolina, as declared by him, and for how long, he answered that returning to Florida for the purpose of seeing if he could not earn some money on account of having spent and consumed that which he had before while a prisoner in Carolina, he had embarked in a pirogue at Port Royal and arrived at Savannah, a town which they said was the capital of New Georgia, through fear of falling in with the English commanding officers of the other ports. He put to sea with the master of the said pirogue, and bad weather

coming on, they were driven in and compelled to save their lives by going ashore on an island called Emilia, whence a guard of four Englishmen there stationed took him to Saint Simon's. Here had his residence a commanding officer called Captain Gasquin, who, after enquiring into the reasons which had brought him thither put him aboard the *manual* or coast guard vessel of the place, invariably forbidding him to communicate with whatever Spanish vessel might be in those waters, until the Commander Don Diego Obletor having arrived from London, he recovered his liberty.

Asked in what manner he had proceeded from those parts to Cartagena, he said that Don Diego Obletor had assisted him to embark in a ship sailing to Virginia, whence he had gone by land to Mallorca.\* Here he embarked in a bilander bound for the French coast of San Domingo, and having arrived, he betook himself to the city, and made report to the President of all that had befallen him; and the President after taking his declaration, had sent him on to Cartagena, to Don Blas de Leso.

Asked if he had been able to learn anything of the posts occupied by the English in those parts, of what strength they were and how fortified before the coming out of the Commander Don Diego Obletor, he answered that he had, that the established posts were Savannah or New Georgia,\*\* containing some 200 houses of wood, very far each from the other, for which reason they take up much room; the town situated on a bank of the river of the same name, on a bluff forty feet high with a battery of 10 pieces, about 8-pounders, without any garrison whatever, the service of the battery being undertaken by the citizens themselves; that only the area surrounding the battery is inclosed by a stockade of pine logs about 18 feet high and one foot thick, and that the rest of the settlement is open; that at the mouth of the river stood a tower of wood constructed both as a lookout

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\* Evidently New York; elsewhere in these papers we have *Noyorca*; the scribe could readily write *Mallorca*, with which name he was acquainted, for *Noyorca*, of which he had probably never heard before.

\*\* It will be remarked that to the affiant, Savannah and New Georgia mean the same thing. Similarly, in the papers that follow, Florida is frequently used where we should write Saint Augustine. Sometimes the context enables us to distinguish between the chief town and the Colony, sometimes it does not. Thus, when Horcasitas tells Montiano "to raze and destroy Carolina and its plantations," he may mean Charleston and surrounding plantations, or the Colony, though the former is perhaps the more likely. Where no doubt can exist, the name of the town has been given in the translation. In other cases the MS. has been followed.



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*The Profile of the Southern Prospect of y<sup>e</sup> Station D. View of y<sup>e</sup> main station, & the Prospect of y<sup>e</sup> Station E. & the Prospect of y<sup>e</sup> Station F.*

*B. The View of y<sup>e</sup> Town Antreca*

*The Profile of y<sup>e</sup> Station D. & the Prospect of y<sup>e</sup> Station E.*

*The Profile of y<sup>e</sup> Station D. & the Prospect of y<sup>e</sup> Station F.*

*The Profile of y<sup>e</sup> Station D. & the Prospect of y<sup>e</sup> Station G.*

*The Profile of y<sup>e</sup> Station D. & the Prospect of y<sup>e</sup> Station H.*

*The Profile of y<sup>e</sup> Station D. & the Prospect of y<sup>e</sup> Station I.*

*The Profile of y<sup>e</sup> Station D. & the Prospect of y<sup>e</sup> Station J.*

*The Profile of y<sup>e</sup> Station D. & the Prospect of y<sup>e</sup> Station K.*

*The Profile of y<sup>e</sup> Station D. & the Prospect of y<sup>e</sup> Station L.*

*The Profile of y<sup>e</sup> Station D. & the Prospect of y<sup>e</sup> Station M.*

*The Profile of y<sup>e</sup> Station D. & the Prospect of y<sup>e</sup> Station N.*

*The Profile of y<sup>e</sup> Station D. & the Prospect of y<sup>e</sup> Station O.*

*The Profile of y<sup>e</sup> Station D. & the Prospect of y<sup>e</sup> Station P.*

*The Profile of y<sup>e</sup> Station D. & the Prospect of y<sup>e</sup> Station Q.*

*The Profile of y<sup>e</sup> Station D. & the Prospect of y<sup>e</sup> Station R.*

*The Profile of y<sup>e</sup> Station D. & the Prospect of y<sup>e</sup> Station S.*

*The Profile of y<sup>e</sup> Station D. & the Prospect of y<sup>e</sup> Station T.*

*The Profile of y<sup>e</sup> Station D. & the Prospect of y<sup>e</sup> Station U.*

*The Profile of y<sup>e</sup> Station D. & the Prospect of y<sup>e</sup> Station V.*

*The Profile of y<sup>e</sup> Station D. & the Prospect of y<sup>e</sup> Station W.*

*The Profile of y<sup>e</sup> Station D. & the Prospect of y<sup>e</sup> Station X.*

*The Profile of y<sup>e</sup> Station D. & the Prospect of y<sup>e</sup> Station Y.*

*The Profile of y<sup>e</sup> Station D. & the Prospect of y<sup>e</sup> Station Z.*

*High Lake Harbor*      *80 y<sup>o</sup> Blackhouse*  
  
*At 111 y<sup>o</sup> the shore land down by water 47 feet to the water*

Sketch of a small building with a gabled roof and a pile of stones or rubble next to it.

Projekt für Lienenbach

Projet d'un Blockhaus sur l'île de  
Der westerliche 10<sup>e</sup> nördliche Pfad

Project for Hurdwick

B 1114. <sup>1</sup> 14. <sup>2</sup> 14. <sup>3</sup> 14. <sup>4</sup> 14. <sup>5</sup> 14. <sup>6</sup> 14. <sup>7</sup> 14. <sup>8</sup> 14. <sup>9</sup> 14. <sup>10</sup> 14. <sup>11</sup> 14. <sup>12</sup> 14. <sup>13</sup> 14. <sup>14</sup> 14. <sup>15</sup> 14. <sup>16</sup> 14. <sup>17</sup> 14. <sup>18</sup> 14. <sup>19</sup> 14. <sup>20</sup> 14. <sup>21</sup> 14. <sup>22</sup> 14. <sup>23</sup> 14. <sup>24</sup> 14. <sup>25</sup> 14. <sup>26</sup> 14. <sup>27</sup> 14. <sup>28</sup> 14. <sup>29</sup> 14. <sup>30</sup> 14. <sup>31</sup> 14. <sup>32</sup> 14. <sup>33</sup> 14. <sup>34</sup> 14. <sup>35</sup> 14. <sup>36</sup> 14. <sup>37</sup> 14. <sup>38</sup> 14. <sup>39</sup> 14. <sup>40</sup> 14. <sup>41</sup> 14. <sup>42</sup> 14. <sup>43</sup> 14. <sup>44</sup> 14. <sup>45</sup> 14. <sup>46</sup> 14. <sup>47</sup> 14. <sup>48</sup> 14. <sup>49</sup> 14. <sup>50</sup> 14. <sup>51</sup> 14. <sup>52</sup> 14. <sup>53</sup> 14. <sup>54</sup> 14. <sup>55</sup> 14. 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and as a beacon for that port, which the English call *Tebi*, and we *Cruces*. And farther to the south lies the Island of Saint Simon, before reaching which there is another fort facing the Island of Santa Cathalina which they call Darien, garrisoned by about thirty Scotchmen, and mounting six guns of the same calibre. That in the aforementioned island [of Saint Simon] there is a town called Frederica situated on the bank of the river Saint Simon, and said to contain thirty or forty houses or huts of boards and palm leaves, with another battery also of ten guns of the said\* caliber, without any troops for its service, the citizens acting as guard. South of this town, say a league and a half, is a careening ground with three or four houses of boards, and on the point on the south of the island they have constructed a battery of sixteen guns of the same calibre to sweep the entrance of the Harbor of Gualquini, which the English call Fort Frederica, beneath whose guns lay the *manual* in which he was a prisoner. Continuing further south, on the Point of Bejecez, on the Isle of Whales stands a fort which they called Saint Andrew with sixteen or twenty men commanded by Captain Makay, mounting ten guns of the same calibre. Still farther south yet is the Island of Emilia which we Spaniards call San Pedro, where they keep four men as a lookout, and have one gun and a stone mortar. That these were at the time in question the settlements, fortifications and forces which they had. He was further of the opinion that all the settlers to be found might number three hundred men, all of whom were capable of bearing arms.

Asked on what date he set forth from those Colonies to go to Virginia, when the Commander Don Diego Oblator arrived, and what troops he brought with him, he answered, that he himself set out on Nov. 4, 1738, of the past year, and that the Commander Don Diego Oblator arrived in the preceding September of the same year with five transports and one vessel mounting more than twenty-two guns, and said to be a warship called the Blandfort, and that in the said transports he had brought over about five hundred men and more according to appearances, said to be regular troops; that in the month of July of said year, Lieutenant Colonel Cocran had arrived from Gibraltar with three hundred men drawn from its garrison, that after the arrival

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\* i. e. said of the battery at Savannah.

of the Commander Obletor there came an English packet boat loaded solely with artillery and implements of war; that the troops mentioned were distributed, six hundred men in the Isle of Saint Simon in Fort Frederica, and two hundred in Saint Andrew; and that at the same time when the five hundred came with the Commander Obletor, came also two hundred women with them, the purpose being to compel the soldiers to marry them.

Asked if after the arrival of all these people, and while he was still in those parts, he had seen or learned whether they were making new fortifications or occupying other posts or laying out new settlements, or whether he detected any especial design of the Commander Obletor, he said that he saw them tracing out under the direction of a French engineer they had brought out, a castle in the fort at Frederica, and for this purpose had collected a supply of bricks and timber in the same Isle of Saint Simon between the town and the careening ground; that with the same engineer they were taking soundings on the bar and in the channel; that they were building two other small forts to command the land approaches from Florida to Georgia so as to guard against any surprise by Spanish Indians; that each one was occupied by a corporal and 20 settlers, that one of these [forts] was called Fort Augustus, but he had forgotten the name of the other; that they had not laid out any new settlements; that he had [not]\* detected any especial design on the part of Commander Obletor, but that he had heard the officers say that the design in view was to take possession of Saint Augustine in Florida, and had remarked that in case the outbreak of war was doubtful they had made certain arrangements looking to this end.

Asked what number of Indians they had under allegiance in those parts, where they were situated, and to what use they were put, he said it seemed to him there were about 200 kept in two towns, one immediately adjacent to New Georgia, in which they had set up a school for the children, and the other must be at Darien; that they were to be used to commit hostilities on the Spaniards and that he had strong proof of this; for while he, the declarant, was there, the Governor of Saint Augustine in Florida had the year before in 1738 written to Captain Gasquin for satisfaction by punishing some Indians guilty of homicide, and that

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\* The context shows that the negative particle has been through error omitted.



he had seen the same Indians on their return from this affair regaled by him with aguardiente and other things, and told that whenever they brought in Spanish scalps they would be rewarded, and that he had this from a nephew of his.

Asked if a town of Esquisaros which is called Surisbu,\* on the bank of the Savannah, adjoining Port Royal due west, is well advanced, and populous, he said that this town is now abandoned and demolished, and that its inhabitants had gone, part to Port Royal, and others to New Georgia, and that only a few plantations had been left.

Asked the population of Port Royal, what fortifications it had, if the anchoring ground is good, and whence come the ships that may anchor there, he said that Port Royal might contain 40 or 50 houses, but that the country is well filled with plantations as far as Saint George, worked by many negroes; that there is a fort called Vinfort at half a league from Port Royal to guard the entrance of the port, square of trace, with 4 curtains and bastions, made of timber, earth and oyster shell, and that he had heard they were adding some sort of outwork; that the anchoring ground of the Port is the best of the entire Province of Carolina, but that in the entrance there is not sufficient depth for vessels of greater burden than that corresponding to 24 or 30 guns at the most.

Asked what harvests they had in New Georgia, and what products were most highly prized, he said that corn, rice, beans, squashes and other vegetables were planted; that the product most prized was silk, that consequently they had planted mulberry trees, and that they continually displayed more and more ardor in this matter.

Asked what kind of boats they had and how many in those rivers, for communicating one port with another, he said that each port had a pirogue with a swivel-gun† in the bow; and that besides, they had two or three canoes, in which they carried supplies back and forth, but that 4 or 5 individuals had their own boats.

Asked what was the purpose of the packet boat under the orders of Captain Gasquin, and what port it served

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\* Purysburg.

† *Pedrero* in MS.. This word means (a) swivel-gun; (b) small gun; (c) stone-mortar. Usually there is nothing in the texts that follow to indicate which is meant. The word is frequently used, and except that the meaning "swivel-gun" is probably correct aboard ship, ashore the context throws no light on the point.

with the greatest frequency, he said that while he was there, it set out thrice to cruise along the coasts of the jurisdiction, and that during the winter it lay in the port of Gualquini in the river of Saint Simon, and added that he had seen as many as twenty pounds of silk made there and of good quality. He affirms that his declaration made under oath is the truth; that he is forty years of age; and signed his declaration, to which His Lordship appended his flourish.

Juan Castelnau.

Before me, Miguel de Ayala,  
Chief Clerk, State and War.

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Petition of Juan Castelnau.

*Memorial.*

Most Excellent Sir: Juan Castelnau, a native of los Pasajes in the Province of Guipúzcoa, kneeling in full devotion at the feet of your Lordship, says that he was captured in New Georgia, where the English held him a prisoner for 18 months, and proceeded to the Island of San Domingo in an English sloop, in order to describe to His Majesty's representatives the state and conditions of the English in that Colony. After having made the proper declaration before the President of San Domingo, he was sent to this port [Cartagenal] in a bilander chartered for the purpose by the said President, in order to inform your Lordship of all matters (as he has done). Desiring now to go on to Havana to inform his Lordship the Governor of that position, should it be necessary, of the state of the Colonies of New Georgia, and to repair his needs by the help of a few friends whom he has in that city, he humbly supplicates your Lordship to grant him authority to take passage in this dispatch boat for the said city of Havana; and to order its Captain to transport him without any cost whatever, a favor he hopes to receive from the compassion of your Lordship.

Cartagena, June 22, 1739.

Juan Castelnau.

## Official

Decree.

Cartagena, June 23, 1739.

Seeing that all the allegations of this person, as set forth in this petition, are true, he is granted permission to go in this dispatch boat to the port of Havana, in case it be important to advise the Governor of that position of all that this person has seen and declared. And the Captain of this dispatch boat will transport him without any cost to the said port of Havana.

Leso.

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A true copy of the originals in my keeping, to which I refer. By oral order of the Governor and Captain General of this Fortress and Island, I give these presents for delivery to his Lordship, written on eight sheets with this one, at Havana, July 21, 1739. I affix my seal [there is a seal] in witness of the truth.

Miguel de Ayala.

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We certify that Don Miguel de Ayala, by whom these affidavits are sealed and signed, is, by royal appointment, a Chief Clerk, State and War, in this city of Havana and Island of Cuba, is faithful, loyal and trustworthy, and as such practices his profession, and receives full faith and credit.

Havana, July 21, 1739.

Christoval Leal, Notary Public (his flourish).\*

Antonio Ponce de Leon, Royal Notary (his flourish).

Tomas de Salas y Castro, Royal Notary (his flourish).

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True copy of the original preserved in these General Archives of the Indies, Case 87, Drawer 1, File 3.

Seville, July 6, 1906.

(Signed) Pedro Torres Lanzas,  
Head Keeper of Archives.

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\* The *rubrica*, or flourish is what gives validity to a Spanish signature. In some cases, the *rubrica* is used alone, without the name of its maker.

LETTER OF MONTIANO TO THE KING ENCLOSING A  
MAP AND GIVING INFORMATION IN RESPECT  
OF FLORIDA AND ADJACENT  
COUNTRIES.

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[ Brief ]

St. Augustine, August 20, 1739.

The Governor, Don Manuel de Montiano, says:

That in order more clearly to justify the right of Your Majesty to the colonies occupied by the English, it has seemed proper to him to enclose a map of these colonies, based on the information received from different persons well acquainted with the country and who have a thorough knowledge of the bars, ports, rivers and roads therein, having trafficked over them, so that having a better knowledge of these territories and of their situation, the proper measures may be taken.

He says further that as appears from these maps, the English have occupied the best bars and the deepest ports capable of sheltering sea-going ships of large size; such as the bar of St. Helens; that of Santa Cruz; that of St. Simon; that of Gualquini; that of the [Bay of] Whales and others of less depth, a thing which Your Majesty does not possess on this entire coast running north and south because the bar of St. Augustine has a depth of only seventeen palms.

He also declares that the River St. Isabel is navigable to within two days' journey of the towns of the Uchee Indians in the provinces of Apalache and that the English having craftily occupied them, may now come down as far as the coasts of the Gulf of Mexico and occupy on it some port, such as that of St. Joseph, Pensacola or others. The consequences of this action would be most fatal to the commerce of our galleons and fleets; and he proposes, in order to prevent this, the occupation of the said Bay of St. Joseph, and that a strenuous effort be made to bring about the evacuation by the English of all the territory from New Georgia toward the south with the Bar of St. Helens; and that whatever territories be left them, limits should be marked out on a line running southeast and northwest, taking from them as many as possible of the towns of the

Uchee Indians and as much as possible of the coast of the Gulf of Mexico. This done, we should succeed in depriving them of all hope for their projects and in holding ourselves ports on that coast, in which our ships and fleets could shelter themselves whenever accident or misfortune should overtake them.

[ The Letter ]

Sir:—

As a result of the remission to Your Majesty of the documents which I have been able to find in the archives of this place [St. Augustinel], justifying the right and title of Your Majesty to the colonies illegally occupied by the English, it has appeared to me proper to add a map of these Colonies, based on the information brought in by different people well acquainted with the country and thoroughly informed in respect of the bars, harbors, rivers and roads by reason of having trafficked over them, so that having a full knowledge of those territories and their situation, Your Majesty may take such measures as may seem suitable. And as I conceive it to be a part of my duty to present to Your Majesty whatever I take to be beneficial to the royal service and to the protection of the royal dominions, I beg leave to set forth to Your Majesty that according to the map, the English have occupied the best harbors and the deepest ports, able to shelter vessels of deep draft, such as the Bar of St. Helens, that of Santa Cruz, that of St. Simon, that of Gualquini, that of the Bay of Whales, and others of less depth; and that Your Majesty, in all the royal possessions of this coast from north to south, owns nothing like these, because this port of St. Augustine has a depth of only seventeen palms. At the same time, I must inform Your Majesty that the River St. Isabel is a navigable one to within two days' journey of the Uchee Indians in the province of Apalache; and that the English have occupied them by craft and cunning, so that they can descend to the coasts of the Gulf of Mexico and occupy on them some port like that of St. Joseph, Pensacola or others, the consequences of which would be most serious for the commerce of the galleons and the fleets of Your Majesty. In order that this may not happen, I make bold to propose to Your Majesty the propriety of occupying the said Bay of St. Joseph and that the whole effort of Your Majesty should be bent on dislodging the English from New Georgia toward the south, including the Bar of St. Helens



and that whatever territories be left to them, their limits should be marked out along a line southeast northwest, taking from them as many as possible of the Uchee towns and those of the coast of the Gulf of Mexico. This would result in depriving them of all hope of carrying out their projects on the Gulf of Mexico and in furnishing Your Majesty harbors on the said coast in which ships, in case of misfortune, may take shelter.

God keep the Catholic Royal Person of Your Majesty, many happy years, as demanded by Christendom.

St. Augustine in Florida, Aug. 20, 1739.

(Sgd) Don Manuel de Montiano.  
(A Flourish)

[ Answer ]

In a letter of the 20th of August, Your Lordship has enclosed in greater justification of the right of His Majesty to the Colonies occupied by the English in those provinces, a map of these Colonies, based on the information given to Your Lordship by different persons well acquainted with the country and having full knowledge of the bars, ports, rivers and roads, by reason of having trafficked over them to the end that having a full knowledge of circumstances, suitable measures might be taken. These matters, having been laid before His Majesty, he is informed of the subject and of the especial exposition which Your Lordship makes at the same time, to the effect that it would be proper to occupy the Bay of St. Joseph and apply all our energies to dislodge the English from New Georgia toward the south, including the Bar of St Helens and that whatever territories be left to them, the limits should be a line running southeast and northwest taking from them as many of the towns of the Uchee Indians and as much of the coast of the Gulf of Mexico as is possible, which would result in robbing them of all hope of success for their projects and in giving us ports on that coast in which, in case of accident or misfortune, our war ships might take shelter.

His Majesty therefore directs me to say to you that he will keep in mind all the facts presented for the betterment of the royal service, and that he is much pleased with the zeal with which you have acquired these facts and communicated them.

May God keep Your Lordship many years.

Madrid, May 24, 1740.

To Don Manuel de Montiano.

Endorsement.

To Don Manuel De Montiano.

Issued in duplicate and triplicate, advising him of the receipt of his report conveying information relating to the English colonies and the districts which the English of Georgia should evacuate.

### THE KING ORDERS THE DISPATCH OF AN EXPEDITION AGAINST GEORGIA.

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The King has entrusted to Don Juan Francisco de Guemes y Horcasitas an expedition of importance the nature of which he will communicate to Your Lordship as directed. Toward the execution and success of this affair, it is proper that Your Lordship, after leaving in a state of defense that [St. Augustine] fortress, should strive with all available forces, and communicate all the information and advice expected, in order that action may be concordant and efficacious. His Majesty commands me to communicate to Your Lordship this decision for your information, and in order that the aforementioned Governor of Havana may advise you with the punctuality demanded by the royal service. May God keep Your Lordship many years.

Madrid, 31 October, 1741.

To Don Manuel de Montiano.

[No signature] \*

The King having resolved upon an expedition from that Island [Cuba] against the enemy, and having decided that its Governor General, Lieutenant Don Juan Francisco de Guemes y Horcasitas should organize it according to the orders sent him, and deeming it proper that whatever be-tide, the troops to be selected for the said expedition shall have their place taken by detachments from the squadron under the orders of Your Excellency, in such numbers as shall not interfere with its navigation, or other functions, His Majesty commands me to say to Your Excellency that you are to furnish these detachments and that if any naval officers should wish to go as volunteers on this expedition, you are not to hinder them. You are to help the aforesaid Governor to the limit of your powers and of the necessities of the case, in order to bring about the end confided to him, by reason of the great interest taken in this

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\* We know, however, from Montiano's answer, that this and the following letters were all sent by the Minister Don Jose de Campillo.



matter by the royal service. God keep Your Excellency many years.

Madrid, 31st October, 1741.

To Don Rodrigo de Torres.

[ No signature ]

With regard to the resolution of His Majesty to set on foot from the Island [Cubal] operations against the enemy, and to the order sent to Lieutenant General Don Juan de Guemes y Horcasitas, Governor of Havana, to carry them out, His Majesty bids me charge you, that in case of your selection to take command, you are to accept and execute that duty, in full confidence, because of your zeal and record of services, that you will ably discharge this trust in all that relates to the royal service.

God keep Your Lordship many years.

Madrid, 31st October, 1741

To Don Antonio de Salas.

[ No signature ]

Your Excellency is informed in respect of the motives which induced His Majesty in the year 1737 to resolve upon the extirpation of the English from the new colony of Georgia and from the territories of Florida which they have usurped, as well as of the orders sent out to this end, and of all dispositions made for their execution, until a suspension was commanded.

I bring these past matters to the recollection of Your Excellency, because we are now in a state of open war, and under no necessity to practice the caution which in the former conjuncture of affairs compelled us to give pause. His Majesty considers the time opportune to accomplish the destruction of Carolina and of its dependencies, thus compensating ourselves for the ancient perfidies of which the English have made the colony the seat, as well as for the present hostilities, by inflicting a damage that will ruin and terrify them, seeing the affection in which they hold that country, and the benefit they derive from its commerce. Accordingly His Majesty has directed the organization of an expedition from that Island [Cubal] to be composed of some regular troops and of as much militia as may be necessary, and that it pass over to the aforementioned province

of Carolina with its appurtenant territories, and devastate it by sacking and burning all the towns, posts, plantations and settlements of the enemy, for the purpose of this invasion must be solely to press hostilities until the effort shall have gone home, and success be achieved. It will help you to know that the English Colonies in America are so weakened by the men and supplies drawn off to lay siege before Cartagena that their relief from England has been under discussion.

It is the intention of His Majesty that in carrying out this expedition, regular troops be used in such numbers as are indispensable, having due regard to the defense of that Island [Cuba]; and that deficiencies be made up with militia and natives in such strength as to secure favorable results, imitating the course we followed when we recovered Pensacola from the power of the French.

In order that the number of regular troops to be selected by Your Excellency for this purpose may not be seriously reduced, you may avail yourself in any emergency that may arise, of those in the squadron under the command of Lieutenant General Don Rodrigo de Torres, provided that he be not reduced to the inability of taking the seas, or of performing any other operations expected of him. To this end, I am inclosing an order which Your Excellency will hand him, directing him to further this enterprise to the utmost, in order to bring it to a happy issue. Although Your Excellency has a personal knowledge of that country, of its nature and conditions, through previous reconnaissances and surveys made in view of practical possibilities, yet His Majesty desires that you communicate and entrust to Don Manuel de Montiano, Governor of Florida, the decision taken, propounding to him the measures to be adopted to carry it out, and directing him to concur with all the forces which the state of defense of his post will allow. Your Excellency is to advise whether the enterprise is to be carried on at one point, or at several points (which here is thought to be the proper course), and to inform him in respect of said points. It is further His Majesty's wish that he give you all the information in his possession, and should go on informing himself as to the state of the English inhabitants of Carolina, and any other matters, knowledge of which might be of import to Your Excellency. I am inclosing a letter for that Governor, in which you will find his instructions.

Other directions and details are omitted, because it is known that Your Excellency has all the knowledge and light that could be desired to bring so grave a matter to a successful end. Hence, and because His Majesty is convinced of your zeal, activity and experience, he intrusts this expedition to your care, directing you to order whatever may forward it, with the determination that springs from your sense of duty and loyalty to the royal service, and without the loss of a moment of time. In respect of expenses, dispositions, and methods, Your Excellency has plenary powers to confer and treat of ways and means with officers and persons who may profit by your advice to spread the desolation and secure the advantages that we expect in respect of that province. And in order that the great volume of preparations may not pass to the knowledge of the English, His Majesty orders that you take your measures in secret, alleging pretexts to dissimulate and conceal the end in view, so as to deceive the public. For otherwise we expose and risk this blow, which is to surprise the enemy without giving him any opportunity to prepare himself by arming and fortifying and so oppose a greater resistance and opposition to our efforts.

His Majesty leaves to the judgment of Your Excellency the selection of the officer or officers to command this expedition: you are authorized to take those most satisfactory to you, and of best known and approved conduct: but in the belief that Brigadier Don Antonio de Salas, who is detained out there [in Cubal] is well fitted for this service, I send Your Excellency the inclosed letter in order that you may give it to him, if you should see fit to employ him for the command (in which case you will be required to furnish him the pay corresponding to his duty, or with such as you may judge proper). If you do not appoint him, you will withhold this letter.

If a few naval officers should wish to go as volunteers, you will approve it, assuring them that His Majesty will not lose sight of their resolution and spirit, but will assist them in whatever may be for their comfort, and Your Excellency will divulge this in ample time, so that the suggestion may appear attractive.

It is by His Majesty's command that I communicate these matters to Your Excellency, so that as soon as you shall have received this letter, you may apply yourself to their accomplishment, and take all other steps that may

lead to the success of an enterprise which His Majesty desires shall be promptly carried out and which it is confidently expected will produce the results expected, as is plain from the fervor and zeal which you have ever shown in His Majesty's service. I should say to Your Excellency that after the enemy's country shall have been laid waste, the troops and militia must withdraw to that Island [Cuba], and a report be made of events.

God keep Your Excellency many years.

Madrid, Oct. 31, 1741.

To Don Juan Franco de Guemes y Horcasitas.

MONTIANO ACKNOWLEDGES THE RECEIPT OF ORDERS  
RELATING TO THE EXPEDITION AGAINST GEOR-  
GIA, AND REPORTS HIS ACTION.

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St. Augustine, in Florida

12 March, 1742.

The Governor, Don Manuel de Montiano, agreeably to the advice, that he must assist with all the forces possible in bringing to a happy issue an expedition against Carolina entrusted to the Governor of Habana,\* reports that he has sent to the said Governor a return of the garrison of that post [Saint Augustine] for the selection of the troops not necessary to its defense, to serve in said expedition, and anticipating a happy issue.

Sir:—

In a letter of the 31st of October of the past year, you did me the honor to say that the King had entrusted to Don Juan Francisco Guemes y Horcasitas, an expedition of importance which he would communicate to me as directed, and that toward the execution and success of this affair, I should, after leaving this post [Saint Augustine] in a state of defense, strive with all available forces, communicating all the information and advice expected, in order that action might be concordant and efficacious. And that His Majesty had commanded Your Lordship to convey this decision for my information to the end that the aforementioned Governor might treat with me with the punctuality called for by the royal service.

With regard to this determination, I have to inform Your Lordship, that as soon as I was informed of it, I set to work to acquire as much information as was possible; and, without losing a moment of time, nor engaging in any other matter, I passed my reports on to the Lieutenant General, Governor of Havana, offering my recommendations charged rather with hopes than with certainties. But it is impossible for me to say how contented I am with the

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\* *Navarra*, in the MS. (itself a copy of the original in the Archives at Seville).

great administration of that Governor General, who will so adjust his measures to action, as morally to persuade me that the favorable results expected are in my opinion almost inevitable.

In respect of other matters, I venture to suggest to Your Lordship, that, according to my comprehension of the case, the design of the King will be the antidote, the wholesome medicine, that will restore to health this debilitated and deserted Province, of good consideration; for Carolina once ruined and destroyed, the extermination of her colonial dependencies will follow, and all the slaves now under her heavy yoke will pass over to us. This is what they most desire: as they are numerous, we shall be able to make here many settlements, and turn their people to account in war. And what is more, it will follow that the Indians, no longer having any one to instigate or protect them, will continue always with us in a state of tranquil peace; these Provinces will grow and people themselves, since they are all as it were *paramos*,\* and families from Galicia and the Canaries will be able to establish themselves in quiet.

I am sending to the aforesaid Lieutenant General, Governor of Havana, a return of the troops of this post, and I leave to his judgment the selection he may, with due regard to the defense of this place, see fit to make for the contemplated expedition. This is all I have to lay of this matter before Your Lordship for the information of His Majesty.

That God keep Your Lordship many years, is my desire.  
Saint Augustine in Florida, 12 March 1742.

Sir: I kiss your hand, being your most grateful servant.

Don Manuel de Montiano

[A flourish follows.]

To Señor Don José de Campillo.\*\*

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\*A *paramo* is a high, bleak plateau; the word is South American. Precisely what plains Montiano had in mind, of course, we do not know. In all probability he uses the word in a loose way.

\*\* One of the ministers of Philip V., remembered as the author of a book, "*Nuevo sistema de gobierno económico para la América*," published posthumously in 1789. In this work, Campillo criticised the system of colonial administration and proposed certain reforms, arraying himself against the military system of conquest followed in America. He argued that this system, however necessary at first, was now out of date, and pleaded for economical liberty.



THE GOVERNOR GENERAL OF CUBA INFORMS THE GOVERNOR OF FLORIDA WHAT TROOPS AND SHIPS WILL BE SENT FROM HAVANA, FOR THE EXPEDITION AGAINST GEORGIA, AND MAKES VARIOUS SUGGESTIONS.

Sir,—

Among the obstacles and difficulties arising in carrying out the will of His Majesty, and communicated by me to Your Lordship under date of February 3rd, past, the most serious was the possibility that, and doubt whether, the English, strengthened by the fresh re-enforcement of 4,000 men which arrived in Jamaica toward the end of January of the present year, would enter the Gulf of Mexico, and attempt to attack this Havana or some other position of the Islands. But this fear has vanished,\* as you may see from the enclosed paper sent me by the Governor of [Santiago del] Cuba, and from the letter of Don Sebastián de Eslava,\*\* Viceroy of Santa Fé,† a copy of which I enclose. The occasion seemed to me therefore opportune to profit by this fortunate conjuncture of affairs, without however being able to furnish the 3,000 men nor the means which your Lordship warned me would be necessary to strike the blow directed by His Majesty. For I have neither the former, nor the frigates suitable to make it attainable in the way that I should prefer, nor any ships of war § to take the place of these frigates, inasmuch as these ships must fulfill their principal purpose.‡

\* The allusion is to the failure of the English troops, some 5,000 in all, to capture Santiago. A squadron under Admiral Vernon and General Wentworth had landed in Guantanamo Bay; after four months' effort, the enterprise was abandoned, with a loss by the English of over 2,000 men from the effects of the climate.

\*\* This officer conducted the defense of Cartagena against Admiral Vernon, who failed in his attempt to capture the place.

† New Granada, in South America, sometimes, as here, called Santa Fe, the Colombia of to-day. It was one of the Spanish vice-royalties, and occasionally called the *reino* (Kingdom) of Santa Fe.

§ In the Spanish navy of the XVIII century "the principal type of war-vessel was the *navío* [line-of-battle-ship] . . . assisted by the *fragata* [frigate] as scout or despatch vessel."

"Brigantines were also used on despatch duty, and packet boats [*paquebotes*]." "Galleys were falling into disuse." "The armament of ships of war consisted of bronze and wrought-iron guns of calibre varying from 36 to 4 (weight in pounds of the projectile). The average range was about 3,000 meters."

Altamira y Crevea, *Historia de Espana*, IV, 189-190.

‡ A British fleet was still in West India waters.

Wherefore I judged that 1,000 regulars and 800 militia would suffice, and under this hypothesis was elaborating this plan, when there arrived here an Englishman, the Captain of the frigate captured by Fandiño, and a man of clear mind and straightforward disposition. I tested and compared his representations with those of Simonin, who, as Your Lordship knows, is thoroughly acquainted with that port and its bar [Frederica], and with the number of whites living in Carolina, and found that his information differed materially from that which Your Lordship had sent me.

As a result of this investigation and of my inability to make a greater effort than the one decided upon, I convoked a secret council of war of whose decision you will be informed by the copy that I am remitting. It is impossible to assemble a greater number of men; and even if it were, we could not transport them, for what has already been done under this head is due to the assistance of Lieutenant General Don Rodrigo de Torres.

I am sending Your Lordship a boat with this news under the seal of inviolable secrecy, so that you may be informed of the determination we have taken, and show the greatest activity in equipping the expedition, to the end that it shall with the greatest promptitude set sail to anchor on that bar [Saint Simon's], and proceed without the slightest delay to the extinction of that country [Georgial]. To carry out these orders Your Lordship will take from your own post 400 regular troops, 300 of your garrison, the 100 who were sent from this place under the command of Don Gregorio de Aldana, and also the 100 of the militia of Pardo, who were sent to you at the same time. From this place will proceed in 30 transports composed of frigates and bilanders, 1,300 men, 600 regulars, 700 militia, composing the 1,800 without counting the seamen; among the transports goes separately the vessel for the 500 men who are immediately to embark at Saint Augustine and besides, two large barges well armed with swivel guns. Of these vessels as many as possible will proceed with guns mounted, to say nothing of a French frigate of 24 guns, which happened to be in this port, and which we took for this expedition, of the packet boat "Diligent," and of the galley. I regard this force as sufficient to attain the end sought with happiness and without risk.



All the stores and water required, go in the said vessels; it will not be necessary to draw even a single ration from your post. The proper ammunition, arms and implements likewise will be sent. Your Lordship will verify the return of property of the Agent of the Exchequer, who is to go in charge of issues and administration. Such being the dispositions taken here, Your Lordship will have equipped the six galliots, the launches, and the pirogues of your garrison, as well as any other vessel that may prove useful; the troops must be ready to embark at once, without the slightest hindrance. For delay would be prejudicial, since the urgency of the whole affair (whose success I believe to be easy) consists in this that the enemy shall neither perceive, nor be warned of, our intentions.

For all reasons, it has seemed to me that your appointment to the command of this expedition will insure its success, for with the knowledge of Your Lordship, your devotion to the throne, your deeds and your experience, go the satisfaction and glory of His Majesty, and the satisfaction of all of us who are interested in his service, rejoicing over the void caused by the forces of Admiral Vernon, because of the task upon which these are engaged.

Colonel Don Francisco Rubiani, Lieutenant Colonel and Commandant of the Regiment of Dragoons of Italica will go hence in command of all that set out. From your own post you will arrange for the services of Don Antonio Salgado as Lieutenant Colonel. Lieutenant Colonel Don Miguel de Rivas may be left behind to command the place.

The Engineer of the Second Grade, Don Antonio de Arredondo, also accompanies the expedition, as being one who knows those parts as far as Port Royal, and has exact and detailed information in respect of everything else. He may be employed by Your Lordship on any duty you may be pleased to order for the best interest of the undertaking, and can take charge of the details of operations. The Engineer Don Pedro Ruiz Olano may also go. Should Don Pedro de Estrada, a man who has given such good proofs of spirit and gallantry, be in Saint Augustine, it would be eminently agreeable that he should fit out his bilander and accompany the expedition in any capacity your Lordship may think proper.

I remain convinced not only of the partial but of the entire success of our enterprise, because of Your Lordship's

known leadership. And I am expecting at the very least that the forces furnished will without the slightest let or hindrance forthwith destroy all the plantations as far as Port Royal. For as Your Lordship knows, it is His Majesty's desire that the sudden blow struck should, as far as its force will reach, and events permit, lay waste Carolina and its dependencies. But this course must be consistent with the information your Lordship may obtain from prisoners, and with other measures to be suggested by your ripe judgment looking to the secure withdrawal of our forces through the interior channels between the Keys. It is of the greatest consequence and importance to raze and destroy Carolina and its plantations. This result can be better secured by first getting rid of the regiment of Oglethorpe, which might proceed to the defense of some other point where hostilities had broken out, if not first attacked where they are now in Gualquini and Saint Simon, as projected. It is entirely probable and credible that surprised by this blow, they will abandon everything and flee to the woods, and thus give us greater freedom to draw full profit from this idea and its opportunity so favorable to us. And if it were possible to find means to notify the negroes in good time to follow the cause which Your Lordship says they desire, this would be an opportune disposition for the complete success of our plans.

The expedition over with the happy issue desired, Your Lordship will take steps for the immediate return, with the least possible expenditure of time, of the troops and militia about to set forth and also of the detachment which I sent on some time ago under the command of Don Gregorio Aldana, sending them in detachments in the vessels which Your Lordship will judge best fitted for the navigation of the Canal. I beg leave to remind Your Lordship that I have only 400 men left for the service of this place.

Whatever I may have forgotten or omitted, I beg Your Lordship's attention and perspicuity to supply, as of one on the spot. It is my desire to overlook not even the most trifling circumstance which might forward the happy issue I am anticipating. May Your Lordship have no other care than to secure and bring victory, unless it be to employ me in any relation in which I may satisfy Your Lordship.

God keep Your Lordship many years.

Havana, May 14, 1742.

Postscript in margin.

I warn Your Lordship that this expedition will sail hence the 2nd or 4th of the next month, according to the effort made to complete its equipment, so as to take advantage of the fine weather, and that you must have made all your preparations, and warned some of the monks of the missions in those parts to go along as missionaries.

Your most affectionate, faithful servant

Who kisses your hand.

Don Juan Francisco de Guemes y Horcasitas.

To Don Manuel de Montiano

THE GOVERNOR GENERAL OF CUBA APPOINTS THE  
GOVERNOR OF FLORIDA COMMANDER OF THE EX-  
PEDITION AGAINST GEORGIA, AND ISSUES HIS OR-  
DERS FOR THE CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS.

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Copy.

Sir,—Having received orders from His Majesty, to send an expedition from this island against the English, his enemy, to punish them for the insults committed against his subjects, by the subjects of Great Britain in Carolina and by those recently and unlawfully settled in His Majesty's territories in a place called Georgia, and impressed by its importance to His Majesty's service and by the pernicious results of having tolerated the aforesaid insults, I have made up a command of all the land and naval forces I can possibly assemble, to accomplish these very just and very important ends, according to the wish of the king.

In consequence of this and of the faculty he has bestowed upon me, to select as the commanding officer of this expedition, one who possesses the requisite character and qualities, I am led to designate you as the Commanding General of all these forces, as much by the confidence I have in your fitness and experience as because of the knowledge which you possess of those places. I am also guided by your affection for His Majesty and your zeal for his service, as shown in your letter of the 3rd of March of the present year.

For the troops which are to be under your orders, I anticipate the greatest success, and I am directing you according to what I believed was best adapted to secure a happy termination, in conformity with the resolution of the board, a copy of which I have sent you, enjoining upon Your Lordship the least possible effusion of the blood of His Majesty's troops and subjects, and to insure in any event a withdrawal. The number of regular troops will be 1,000, with proper number of officers, and of militia 800, composed of whites, mulattoes and negroes, also properly officered. These troops you will assign as will seem best to you.

The naval forces which it has been possible to assemble are reduced to one frigate of 24 guns, to a packet boat of 14, one galley, and the six galliots which you have with you; two schooners, two bilanders, and two barges and pirogues under oars, which will be used to convoy the transports, guard and cover the coasts and inlets, and to manage and carry on within the interior channels the movement and landing of troops during the operations. All these elements (excepting the troops to embark at Saint Augustine, and the schooner and pirogues to join there) will leave this port [Havana] under the command of Colonel Don Francisco Rubiani, Lieutenant Colonel, Governor, and Commanding Officer of the Regiment of Dragoons of Italica, who is to arrive off your bar, and deliver this letter to Your Lordship. He will be under your orders as second in command and join his forces with the troops and vessels, which are to be ready in the port for the campaign.

As the fundamental condition of the most rapid and easy outcome of the expedition, and of the reduction of risks, consists in making withdrawal sure, in whatever misfortune, I regard as indispensable the invasion before anything else is attempted, of the Island of Saint Simon, first occupying the northern entrance so as to close the pass to the enemy, and intercept any relief he might receive from that direction; the landing is to take place from three vessels at one and the same time on the beach facing east.

This first step having been, thanks to the Divine Grace, and to Your Lordship's wise management, successfully taken, Your Lordship will next adopt such measures as are suggested by the information you may have or obtain, to proceed northward by interior channels, devastating, laying waste, sacking and burning whatever settlements, plantations, and towns there may be as far as Port Royal inclusive, razing its fort, and taking possession of the entire country; for Your Lordship is informed of the fact that those parts hold no hostile troops able to resist those under your command. The necessity of gaining time whenever possible, without any delay must ever be kept in mind, so as to give no opportunity for resistance to form. Our operations must, under His Majesty's commands, be reduced to a sudden stroke, and for this reason the greatest celerity is imperative.

After taking possession of Port Royal, it will be proper to send out negroes of all languages (some of which sort



accompany the militia of this place for this very purpose) to convoke the slaves of the English in the plantations round about, and offer them, in the name of our King, liberty, if they will deliver themselves up of their own accord, and to say that lands will be assigned them in the territories of Florida, which they may cultivate and use for themselves as owners, under the direction and laws of the Kingdom of Spain. In proportion as you receive and obtain (and this I believe will be the case) trustworthy and favorable information forwarding the conquest and increasing the damage done the enemy, you will act accordingly, never losing sight of the importance of making sure of your withdrawal, in order not to lose the fruit of our operations.

All the neutral and friendly vessels met on the way, you may detain, requiring them to follow the convoy, until there shall be no disadvantage in allowing them to proceed on their course. To the person who goes as agent in charge of all matters relating to the Royal Exchequer, in respect of the good and economical administration of warlike stores and implements, you will afford all necessary help, showing him and requiring him to show the greatest attention, corresponding to the confidence I have reposed in him, and maintaining the best of relations with him, in order that the service may thus be punctually and easily performed.

All the effects found and taken by our troops you will collect and keep in a secure place under the supervision of the agent of the Royal Exchequer, who will be required to make an inventory for the distribution in equal parts among soldiers, militia and sailors.

As regards prisoners, in respect of whose classes and numbers no decision can be reached in advance, Your Lordship will take such measures as seem most suitable; just as in all the other cases that come up, you will make such decisions as most redound to the advantage of the King's service, and to the glory and reputation of his arms.

The expedition having been concluded with the happy issue that we have a right to expect, Your Lordship will direct that the troops and militia of this place [Havana] return to it without the slightest delay, in the vessels that can make the best way through the channel,\* seeing that

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\* The Florida Channel.

now the southwest winds will prevail; all the ships will take the same course, even at the cost of increased labor and of a longer voyage, because thus we avoid encounters which otherwise might have injurious consequences for us.

The Second Engineer, Don Antonio de Arredondo, goes informed with regard to all I have been able to anticipate and advance for the success and safety of this important operation. He will communicate with you, so that you may select what may appear to you best fitted for the happy issue of our plans, the glory and satisfaction of our royal master, and of his royal intentions. I am inclosing to your Lordship a full copy of the orders under which I have been acting, and of which I beg that you will acquire full understanding.


Commending myself to your Lordship in the sincerest affection, I pray Our Lord to keep you many years.

Havana, June 2, 1742. Your most affectionate faithful servant, who kisses your hand.

Don Juan Francisco de Guemes y Horcasitas.  
To Don Manuel de Montiano.




## Illustrations of Spanish Guns.



PEDRERO.

40 cm. Cal., 21 cm. long.

1709 A. D. 6031 Artillery Museum.  
Madrid.




5477 Cannon.

310 cm. long, 15.2 cm. Calibre.

XVIII Century.

Artillery Museum, Madrid.




BOMBARD—mounted and assembled.

Length { Cana            255 cm.  
          { Recamara    81 " } Made 1518 A. D.

No. 3301 in Artillery Museum, Madrid.

This piece has 2 recamaras—used alternately.




3356 Artillery Museum,  
Madrid.


Made 1679.

PEDRERO.

144 cm. long, 16.5 cm. Calibre.




5489. Museum of Artillery, Madrid.  
MORTAR  
1773 A. D.



BOMBARD Complete  
240 cm. long XV Century.

No. 6587 Artillery Museum  
Madrid.



3570 Artillery Museum, Madrid.  
FALCONET XV Century.  
105 cm. long, 6.7 cm. Calibre.

## ORDERS TO THE COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE FLEET.

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Orders to be obeyed by the commander of the Fleet, and instructions for his guidance, with the understanding that he is in all matters to be under the orders of the general selected to command the expedition which is to dislodge the foreigners that have settled and established themselves in the dominions of the King in the Provinces of Florida.

1. He will leave the post of Havana, if the weather permit, on the day appointed, with all the vessels of war and transports after having made all necessary arrangements to keep his ships together in good order during the journey, and established signals for prompt comprehension and correct action in any case that may come up. He will likewise have drawn up the special orders to be observed with all the precision and clarity possible by the respective commanders of the vessels under his command

2. He will proceed directly to Saint Augustine in Florida, without anchoring anywhere, unless driven to it by inevitable necessity.

3. When in sight of the Bar of Saint Augustine he will approach as closely as possible, and anchor with his entire fleet on the bar.

4. As soon as the tide serves, he will order the transports to enter the harbor, and anchor in front of the castle.

5. As soon as the said tide nears the flood, he will determine whether the depth on the bar will permit the entrance of the vessels under his command, without lightening, and if so, these will enter, and proceed to anchor in front of the Hermitage of Our Lady de la Leche. Should lightening prove necessary, all will execute it at the same time with the greatest dispatch, transporting in launches and boats the weight that may be necessary. But this is to be done only in case it is impossible, by reason of storms, to remain at anchor outside.

6. He will remain in port (or wherever else he may think proper) until the commanding general gives orders

to begin operations and put to sea with his entire fleet, which he will obey without loss of time.

7. He will convoy the flotilla of small vessels that are to cross the bar of the Saint John's River, until he sights its inlets on an east and west line, when he will either lie-to, or if the weather permit, anchor; the first is the better course, if it should be necessary to go outside under the threat of the east wind, dangerous on this coast; the second, in order to avoid drifting with the currents. Circumstances must determine which of these two courses appears to him the better, without losing sight of the fact that he must endeavor as far as possible to keep the coast in view during the entire course of the expedition so as distinctly to observe the signals made from it, or to receive information sent out to him, since the happy issue of the enterprise depends partly if not entirely on the unity and joint effort of the two fleets.

8. He will lie-to or remain at anchor, as may be determined, off the inlets, until he shall have received from the beach a signal to proceed on his course.

9. He will continue on his way, observing both by day and by night the signals made to him from land, so that on receiving information of the point at which the interior flotilla happens to be resting, he will again anchor or lie-to, until again ordered to proceed. For, as the interior flotilla can proceed only when the tide is favorable, at intervals of six hours and a few minutes, it is incumbent on the sea fleet so to adjust its progress, as to be but a short distance away, and so avoid slipping on and then being discovered by the foreigners of Fort Frederica or Gualquini before the interior flotilla shall have come up and taken its disposition for attack.

10. Should some accident prevent people coming down to the shore to make signals, he will proceed along the coast under shortened sail; and, after taking into account the change of tides, and whatever may further the advance, will estimate approximately where the interior flotilla must be, giving due regard to the increase of distance caused by the windings of the interior channels, and by the fact that on some nights it will perhaps be impossible to sail and take advantage of the tide on account of a few narrow passes impossible to navigate save by day.

11. He will also consider a possible delay due to the capture of the Fort of Vegeses on the channel of the Island



of Whales, this in order that both fleets may always be approximately on the same parallel. And if all the precautions mentioned should remain without the result expected, after having maturely weighed the aforesaid contingencies, and adjusted his course accordingly, he will set his course directly for the entrance of Gualquini, where he will anchor on the bar with his entire squadron in from four and a half to six fathoms, so as to bring the point of the north of the Island of Saint Simon to bear N. N. W., and that of the north of the bar of Whales to bear S. W.  $\frac{1}{4}$  S. If while on this position, the sea should rise and, unable to ride it out, he should fear that his cables would not hold, he may go in nearer to shelter himself, setting his course N. W.  $\frac{1}{4}$  W., and proceeding some four miles in four fathoms of water, so that the said point of the Island of Saint Simon shall bear N., that of Whales S. S. W., and the Castle of Frederica W. N. W., this being recognizable by the reddish color of the mound of earth at the shoulder of the bastion. If however, he can maintain himself without the said risk in the said six fathoms, he will do so, in order to be in a better position to land, on account of the surf on the shoals at the entrance.

12. He will maintain himself thus at anchor, with the English flag flying, unless signalled to get under way and capture the port. This the commanding general will order to take place on the beach of the south point at the place marked R,\* whenever the opportune occasion shall arise, as determined by his readiness to surprise or attack the fort which the foreign settlers have built on the island in question. This in turn will depend on the time of junction of the two fleets, provided always that not the slightest movement shall take place until the proper signal is made.

13. As soon as he shall see the said signal, he will order the landing body assigned to this duty with its officers to embark in launches, and direct it to go ashore on the nearest beach of the Island of Saint Simon outside of the surf of the north shoals, near the point Q.

14. The said landing shall be so ordered that the troops shall set foot ashore a short time before dawn, neither sooner nor later. To this end he shall measure the time he may consider necessary, having the day before marked the

\* The chart to which reference is made here and elsewhere in these orders, has apparently not come down to us.

shoals and indicated the nearest point for the execution of the plan, and approximately observed the distance between shipside and shore. Although announcing that one and the same signal will be made of the arrival of the interior flotilla in the Bay of Gualquini, of the disembarkation of the troops and of their getting under way to enter the port, yet, even though the said signal be made at the hour of prayers, or later, or at any other hour, he will not on that account undertake any movement before the time already mentioned of the break of day, unless the signal should be made to undertake everything at the moment when it is set, no matter what the hour, because it is possible that this course might be advantageous; and in this case he will without the slightest delay set about the disembarkation, and get under way to capture the port provided that this operation take place by daylight.

15. As soon as the launches carrying the troops shall have sheered off, the commander will, if the tide be falling, stand by with his anchors apeak; if not falling, he will hoist sail; if the wind does not serve, he will begin to tow, or do whatever he thinks best. With the bilanders leading ahead by the hawse he will set out to capture the port, using his best endeavor to have the landing troops very early in the morning surprise the look-out of the foreigners, marked O on the chart. He will also cause the fleet to take the port as early as possible, so that the enemy seeing himself attacked on all sides without hope of relief shall at once surrender without resistance.

16. This bar of Gualquini lies in north latitude  $31^{\circ} 18'$ , with 6 to  $4\frac{1}{2}$  fathoms at the point mentioned above. To enter the port, set the course N. W.  $\frac{1}{4}$  W., and continue on it in  $4\frac{1}{2}$  and 5 fathoms till  $3\frac{1}{2}$  are reached; shift to N. W.  $\frac{1}{4}$  N., when the bar will be found, with  $3\frac{1}{2}$  fathoms at half tide. From this point with course N. W.  $\frac{1}{4}$  W., easing to N. W., 5, 6, and 7 fathoms will be found, deepening until a line north and south through the fort of the strangers is crossed, where 14 fathoms will be obtained, shallowing as shown on the chart.

17. Having taken the position mentioned with his squadron, if the foreigners open fire on him with their artillery, he will return it, as will also all the boats under his command, signal having been previously made to form in line and to fire on the enemy in the aforesaid case. But if they do not open fire upon his ships, he will in no wise fire him-



self, but will merely order his vessels to anchor in good order in the part marked thus Y, provided that if he should be compelled to fire against the hostile fort, he will endeavor to dismount and disable its guns. He will direct that in going about, so as to use both broadsides, all vessels must have their launches and boats ahead by the hawse, to prevent drifting with the current, in order that they may with the greatest promptitude forge ahead or in any other direction which may appear to him suitable. It is indispensable that each vessel go about in the proper place in which it may find itself, the vanguard and rear guard standing on opposite tacks. For if the said maneuver is not executed in this form and the ships lose their positions, it will be impossible to make head against the current so as to present the other broadside to the enemy.

18. From the conditions already laid down, it is evident that the ships should lie-to when delivering their fire, keeping up against wind and current in such manner as to secure, without undue drifting, a good position for the purpose in hand.

19. It is possible that in this port of Gualquini we shall find at anchor a packet boat or war vessel which they own. If this shall not have surrendered when he arrives with his squadron, he will take possession of it, either by capitulation or by force, if it resists; he must send it to the bottom without giving quarter to anybody; but if it surrenders voluntarily, he will give it the best treatment possible.

20. If while at anchor outside on the bar with the English flag flying, as already arranged, there should come out, as is usual, a boat to reconnoiter or to bring a pilot, he will cause it to be captured with the boats and launches which he will have overboard and ready from the moment he shall have anchored.

21. Should he be forced by any wind to remove from the coast and for this reason be unable to see all the signals, then, as soon as the wind shall have ceased, he will return to the coast, and depending on the length of time that he will have been absent, he will examine the state in which he finds the interior flotilla. As a measure of prudence, and according to the conclusions arrived at, he will see to it that no matter what cause, contingency, delay, or weather shall have come up, the flotilla shall cross over to the Bay of Gualquini and take whatever action has been decided upon.

22. Whenever he encounters vessels, he will cause them to be searched as he may think proper; but no matter of what nation they may be, he will, for the purpose of embarrassing the enemy, take possession of them, either peacefully or by force, and of all the commercial vessels belonging to these new colonies, from which are to be evicted the intruding settlers as having furtively and illegally settled upon them. But if these vessels should be registered from Noyorca\* and bound to St. Augustine with stores for its garrison, or else returning from the said place to their own country or coming from any other country, in respect of which the reason given above does not hold good, he will not capture them, but will compel and order them to continue their voyage under his convoy. He will take these precautions to make sure of the first class of vessels, and to detain the second, until the commanding general may have taken cognizance of the case and ordered that there is no objection to giving them their liberty.

23. The bilanders and other smaller vessels under his command will proceed nearer to the coast than the larger ships, in order that they may the more clearly and promptly pick up the signals made from it and communicate them to the flagship, according to the directions which the commander of the fleet shall have given to this end before leaving port.

24. As soon as this operation shall have been concluded, he will leave the port of Gualquini with his squadron and landing body and proceed directly to the Bay of Saint Simon, at whose entrance he will anchor on the bar in proper order and with the same precautions which he observed in that of Gualquini. Here he will remain until the commanding general orders him by pre-arranged signal to put to sea, so that if the signal should be set to disembark his people, he will answer by executing the order and sending his launches to the beach on the south point of the entrance. In this case, he will order the captains of the bilanders to sail into the harbor and join hands with the interior flotilla, with orders to fire on the redoubt of the foreigners, if this should open. If on the contrary, it should not, he will keep his station with his ships without undertaking any movement whatever as much to avoid risking his ships in entering and leaving the harbor as because it

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\*New York, probably.

has been considered unnecessary to employ so great a force in the reduction of the redoubt and its garrison, and principally to prevent hostile vessels from going south and thus possibly embarrassing the withdrawal of our own vessels through the interior channels. To this end, he will constantly maintain in the tops a good guard of men of the utmost trustworthiness, who will attentively keep a good lookout in all directions.

25. As soon as he shall have seen the bilanders leaving the said port and a signal to make sail and continue the voyage, he will obey it, setting his course with his entire squadron direct for the bar of Las Cruces [Tybee Bar]; and without waiting for any other order or signal, he will enter the bay.

26. The mouth of Las Cruces, he will recognize by means of a lofty, wooden tower, which the foreigners have built on the north point; on the south, they have a small redoubt.

27. On coming within sight of the said bar, he will hoist the English ensign and will keep it flying until he shall have entered and placed himself in a position to prevent communication of this event to other parts. He will then hoist the Spanish ensign and at the same time will send an officer ashore under a white flag with orders to inform the commanding officer of the fort, that if he does not surrender without resistance or delay, he will be put to the sword with his entire garrison without exception, and to tell him at the same time that the remaining forts and settlements of the south have been depopulated and ruined and that a strong fleet is coming by the interior channels to destroy and reduce to naught those which may have remained.

28. The officer designated for this duty will carefully observe the disposition and force of the redoubt and the strength of its garrison in order that in case of refusing to surrender and offering resistance, the most convenient and best measures may be taken to capture it. He will withdraw to his ship, as soon as he has executed his commission.

29. While all this is going on, he [the Naval Commander] will anchor in the middle of the channel, posting the vessels under his order, so as to occupy both mouths of

the Tamaja,\* these being the same which on joining form the Savannah River. In this way, all the approaches will be covered and the communications of the enemy embarrassed.

30. If the commanding officer of the said fort should surrender without resistance, the garrison will be distributed among the vessels of the fleet, orders being given to treat them well. The guns, munitions and stores found will be collected and orders given to burn to the ground all the houses and to ruin and destroy whatever may be found. The same orders will be issued with regard to the tower mentioned.

31. If the commanding officer, in contempt of the courteous and peaceful proposition made to him, should decide to defend himself, the naval commander will make the best disposition to invest the place. He will disembark troops in sufficient number, having regard to the report on the garrison of the fort and its situation made by the officer he sent ashore, to secure success without risk, because if he considers that the operation is somewhat difficult he must not expose himself, but instead will send with the greatest dispatch one or two launches, well armed and manned, to the south through the channels, with an officer to report everything accurately to the general; and, in addition, the conclusion he had come to in respect of what is needed to attack and conquer the said fort and settlement. The officer will be enjoined to travel night and day until he shall have met the interior flotilla. He must be furnished with the countersign and parole because it is considered important that this information should reach the general as soon as possible.

32. Even should the commanding general of the fort surrender without resistance, the two launches will be sent to report this result to the commanding general with all the incidents which may have occurred, and with an account of the state in which it was found.

33. Since it is possible in the said port to find a few vessels from Europe, bringing stores and people, for the support of these settlements, he will take as many as he shall

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\* This word suggests the Altamaha: but as this stream has no connection with the Savannah, it is not impossible that the scribe has written T for Y, and that the word is really Yamaja, i. e., Yamacraw. If this emendation be acceptable, then the author of these orders probably has some local con-figuration in mind.

have found, using them for the service and re-enforcement of his squadron. He will take the most exact precautions for safety until the general shall have joined and given directions, the expedition being concluded, for its orderly and well-arranged withdrawal.

There is no doubt that in all relations the general will labor, in accordance with the zeal and experience he is known to have, for the complete success of the royal service, and the glory and reputation of the king's arms. In respect of accidents which cannot be anticipated, I have confidence that his experience and prudence will lead him to display the same zeal in prosperity as in adversity, and a perfect constancy, such that neither will success produce the slightest carelessness nor misfortune abate his courage, keeping in mind, as he will, that all of us depend upon the Divine Omnipotence to which must be attributed both prosperity and adversity, while displaying on his own part the diligence, activity and strength that are required to achieve success in anything upon which we have set our hearts.



LETTER OF THE GOVERNOR GENERAL OF CUBA TO  
THE KING'S MINISTER, ANNOUNCING THE FAILURE  
OF THE EXPEDITION AGAINST GEORGIA, AND EN-  
CLOSING TWO JOURNALS OF EVENTS.

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Sir,—

Hoping as I have been from day to day to receive from Florida the happy news I had promised myself of the successful results achieved by the expedition against the English Colonies in the North, I had kept back the dispatch boat under the command of Don Juan Baptista Goicochea, which had entered this port from Vera Cruz on its way back to Spain, so as more promptly to communicate this news.

Accordingly, on the eighth instant, through the fortunate arrival, after 42 days' journey, of a boat which was sent to me, I learned that the first convoy of small vessels had on the 9th of June safely reached the Bar of Saint Augustine, as did on the 15th of the same month, that of the larger ones, which left this port under the orders of the Naval Lieutenant, Don Antonio Castañeda. At Ratonos Inlet, the messenger was pursued by an English sloop, which was trying to capture him, and so he was compelled to run aground, but succeeded in saving all his people and the dispatches which later he managed to send on to me in a coast fishing boat.

Just when I thought that the expedition was at least well advanced, if not as completely successful as we had reason to expect, the Governor of Florida tells me in letters that I received, dated the 26th, and postdated the 28th and 29th of the same month of June, that partly on account of the bad weather and partly on account of the necessity of watering the boats, and of other inconveniences arising out of the difficulties and dangers of navigation over that bar [the Bar of St. Augustine], he had been as yet unable to embark the troops which were to set out from that garrison to join hands with those from this particular place and with the militia which has been selected for the purpose. Upon this aforementioned day, the 29th, he was still at

St. Augustine with all the troops on board ready to put to sea to carry out the orders with which he was charged. The Engineer of the Second Class,\* Don Antonio de Arredondo reports the same thing to me, sending me the journal which accompanies this letter and includes the 23d of the said June. From this journal, Your Excellency will take note of the encounter between some of the small vessels of the first convoy, on the coast of Florida between the Bar of Mosquitos and that of Matanzas. It would seem that the English had gone in a boat and launch to capture a small sloop from the presidio of Florida, which was carrying the detachment of artillerymen from the garrison of this place [Havanal] as well as to capture another launch from this port. As they boarded these vessels to loot them, our people who had jumped ashore, fired upon them from the sand dunes, and compelled them to surrender to the number of sixteen, among them a lieutenant of the frigate. In this affair, we had the misfortune to lose the sub-lieutenant of artillery and the corporal of the detachment.

Notwithstanding Arredondo's assertion, under date of 19th, in his journal, that from a few prisoners returned by Don Diego Oglesor, Governor of Georgia, to the coasts of Florida, it was learned they had discovered nothing of our plans, yet I feared that they had been warned by the delay, so far of 14 days, off the bar of Saint Augustine, of a fleet so numerous as ours and that it was not impossible that they might be on their guard, and so hinder us; and all this in spite of the effort I had made in advance, to advise the Governor of Florida through an officer (as I informed Your Excellency in a letter of June 8, of which I inclose a duplicate), who arrived more than 20 days before the arrival of the convoy of larger vessels under the command of Don Antonio de Castañeda.

Having received this news, and fearing that through the delay they had already made they might suffer, if supplies should be lacking, and in order to forestall any accident due to necessity or want, I at once prepared a brigantine and a sloop to send a month's supplies in addition to those of three months and a half that they took out with them. These boats left this port with the stores on the 15th inst. On

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\* *Ingeniero en segundo*. It was not until 1756 that engineers held military rank in the Spanish army. Elsewhere in these papers, Arredondo is given the first grade, *ingeniero en jefe*.



the following day there returned to it a sloop, one of those that had set out with the expedition, and in it came Naval Lieutenant the Marquess de Casinas and the captain of the militia battalion of this place, Don Laureano Chacon, with his company. From these officers I learned that the issue of the expedition had not corresponded to our well-founded hopes and to the measures that had been taken for its success, and that all the vessels in different divisions had struggled to regain Florida and this place Havana, without any other result than that of having attacked Gualquini with success, capturing its forts, artillery, mortars, munitions and implements; and that this outcome was due to the bad weather which had delayed and disordered the execution of our plans, to say nothing of hindrances later encountered and felt.

I have up to the present day no other information than that given me by the aforesaid officers, and that which is contained in more or less detail in the private diary kept by the Marquess de Casinas of daily events, and brought off by him and given to me.

Seeing now that the whole expedition had begun to retreat and that they had sighted land six leagues farther to the south of Saint Augustine, these officers judged it proper to set their course for this port and assured me that the other boats were doing the same thing.

Such being the news in hand, it has appeared to me proper no longer to delay the dispatch boat under the command of Don Juan Baptista Goicochea. As soon as I shall have received the information to be given me by the Governor of Florida, it will be dispatched in another boat which I am holding ready for the purpose. I shall then explain with greater particularity all that has happened and the reasons that prevailed against continuing the expedition and in favor of forming the resolution to retreat.

As I had already made up my mind, from the condition in which I considered the enemy to be and from the superiority of our forces, that at the very latest, his towns, plantations and settlements would be attacked and destroyed as far as Port Royal; and as I had even flattered myself that these favorable results might be obtained as far as Carolina [Charleston] I have been profoundly astonished at the frustration of hopes so well founded of serving the king advantageously and maintaining the glory of his arms; and that the labor and zeal inspired by my devotion,

and by my interest in our success should have come to naught. But although not successful everywhere, yet according to the relation of the Marquess de Casinas, the destruction of the forts and settlement of Gualquini and that of Bejeces was accomplished. That many stores and implements should have been destroyed, and the harbor gallantly forced in the face of all its fire, both by sea and land, with such intrepidity, as reported by those to whom I have talked on the subject, is due to Don Antonio Castañeda.

The King and Your Excellency do not need to be informed how deeply I am mortified that this expedition has not been carried out to the complete satisfaction of His Majesty's desires; and that on my part nothing was omitted that could have the least bearing on its happiest issue. Until all the vessels with the troops and militia shall have returned, I shall take all the precautions that are due.

Praying Your Excellency to report to His Majesty the results so far of this operation, may God keep Your Excellency many years.

Havana, August 18, 1742.

Excellent Sir:

Your most humble, grateful servant kisses your hand.

Don Juan Francisco,

Guemes y Horcasitas.

(A Flourish.)

To His Excellency Don Joseph de Campillo.

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[Letter acknowledging receipt of that of Guemes, with papers.]

With the letter of Your Excellency of the 18th of August, have been received the accompanying reports and diary, treating of the management and progress of the expedition which left your port against Carolina. We have also the news reported to Your Excellency, through Naval Lieutenant Don Carlos Riggio (who has arrived at that place [Havanal]) by the Governor of Florida, and also that forwarded by Your Excellency in a letter of the 20th, to the effect that on that day Don Antonio Castañeda returned to that port [Havanal] with the greater part of the convoy and troops. The King, having acquainted himself with your report upon the measures and arrangements you made for

this expedition, and also with your reflections upon its issue, and the reasons why it did not come up to the expectations produced by the forces and arrangements with which it was undertaken, desires me to express to Your Excellency his satisfaction with everything done by Your Excellency, a satisfaction in exact agreement with the confidence he was gracious enough to repose in your zeal and efficiency. He considers as entirely sound the remarks you make upon the unhappy issue of events. His Majesty understands that this is to be traced to the poor direction, lack of diligence and inefficiency of the one who should have made extraordinary efforts to profit by the advantages that placed success within his grasp.

May God keep you many years.

San Ildefonso, October 28, 1742.

To Don Juan Francisco Guemes y Horcasitas.\*

**JOURNAL KEPT BY DON ANTONIO DE ARREDONDO,  
CHIEF ENGINEER OF THE PRESENT EXPEDITION.**

June 5, 1742.

At sunrise the signal was made to put to sea and executed by the entire convoy, as it was ready to sail. At twelve o'clock, we sallied from the Morro, at which time we hauled up our launches and boats; steady drizzle.

June 6th.

From yesterday noon until today at the same hour: at one o'clock in the afternoon we ran into a rain squall without wind, which lasted until 5. We stood all night under foresail and mizzen sail until 5 o'clock in the morning. At noon, we took the sun, but as there were great differences in the observations, we took the mean to fix the course which was northeast by north.

June 7th.

From yesterday until today: at sunset, all the elements of the convoy kept together. At nine in the evening, great signs of a squall which burst upon us with thunder, lightning and rain, lasting until one o'clock in the night. At sunrise two vessels were missing. At noon, we took the

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\* Not signed but probably written by Campillo. In the MS. this letter follows Arredondo's diary. We have put it where it belongs, immediately after the letter which it acknowledges.

sun and found our latitude to  $24^{\circ} 40'$ , and our longitude  $295^{\circ} 16'$ . At this hour the two boats which had been missing rejoined us.

#### June 8th.

From yesterday until today: at one o'clock in the afternoon, we sighted Long Key, its northeast head bearing north five and a half degrees toward the east and the southwest point, west. At sunset all the vessels were together. At midday the sun gave us  $25^{\circ} 3'$  latitude and longitude  $295^{\circ} 40'$ , all the vessels being together.

#### June 9th.

At three of the afternoon, signal was made to crowd on all sail which was kept up till four. At six land was discovered from the top and recognized by the pilot as Biscayne Key which bore west by north at a distance of five leagues. At six in the morning, the top announced that only twenty-two vessels were in sight: at seven, land was visible and after examination by the pilot he declared that it was the shore of Jega, bearing west by northwest. At 8 a sloop signalled that she wished to speak to us, and observing that her bowsprit had been injured, the Honduran was sent to find out what was the matter, and returned saying, that it was the royal sloop "St. Joseph," and that the night before, on going about, the guard schooner had fouled her, and thus had damaged her bowsprit, but that she was not making any water nor had suffered any other damage. At noon we took the sun and found ourselves in  $26^{\circ} 54'$  latitude and  $295^{\circ} 25'$  longitude. On this day a sloop of the convoy was missing.

#### June 10th.

From yesterday until today: at 4 of the afternoon, we sighted main land, being the palm grove of Ays, according to the pilot. At 5, signal was set to go about, which was executed by the entire convoy, the course being set S. E., with the wind E. N. E. At sunset the top announced that only twenty-two vessels were in sight. At this hour we had lost the land. The whole night remained calm. At sunrise we saw the same vessels as those of yesterday afternoon and found at noon our latitude to be  $28^{\circ} 28'$  and longitude  $292^{\circ} 15'$ .

## June 11th.

From yesterday until today: at 1:30 of the afternoon signal was made to put about, which was done, and the course set W.  $\frac{1}{4}$  N. W., the wind being north and light. At sunset all the boats visible this morning were still in sight. The whole night a moderate wind blew out of the southwest. At sunrise twenty-one vessels were seen. At noon, we took soundings and found ourselves in twenty-two fathoms, bottom reddish gravel and dark colored sand. At ten, we tacked to the S. S. W., wind west, and at noon our latitude was  $30^{\circ} 1'$  and longitude  $295^{\circ} 10'$ .

## June 12th.

From yesterday until today: at 2:30 of the afternoon sounded in twenty-six fathoms; found the bottom the same, for which reason we decided to cast anchor because the currents were carrying us to leeward. Signal to this effect was made and obeyed. At sunset only eighteen vessels were seen because apparently the currents had prevented their keeping together, and at the same time it was conjectured that they were invisible because the horizon was overcast. The entire night was calm, with the wind to the southwest, but we found the currents extremely strong; at 5:30 of the morning, signal was made to hoist sail, which was done with the wind to the northwest, course S. W. Only fifteen vessels were visible, being those only that had anchored. At noon, our observation gave us  $29^{\circ} 42'$  latitude, and longitude  $245^{\circ} 4'.$ \*

## June 13th.

From yesterday until today: at one of the afternoon, we set our course W. S. W., with the wind north, northwest, eastern horizon heavily submerged. At three of the afternoon we saw land but could not make out what it was, bearing W.  $\frac{1}{4}$  S. W., at a distance of three leagues. At sunset signal to go about and set the course east, wind north, northeast. At this hour only fourteen vessels were in sight. The eastern horizon was strongly overcast, with more or less indications of weather. At ten at night the wind freshened from the north into a squall so that we stood under foresail and mizzensail. At three in the morning signal was made to change our course to the E. S. E. and S. E., with the wind northeast, this on account of having sounded and found only twelve fathoms and a half. The night con-

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\* So in original, probably Copyist's error for  $295^{\circ} 4'$ .



tinued calm with some swell until half past four, when the wind settled in the south and southeast with many squalls and showers. At this hour we set our course to the E, and E.  $\frac{1}{4}$  N. E. At sunrise, the sun being invisible, the top announced that fifteen vessels were in sight. Afterwards two others, small ones, were discovered and a frigate to the windward which made a signal of recognition which was answered, and we found it to be the *Sacra Familia*, so that we were now eighteen, all told. At ten we sounded in fifteen fathoms and the skies having cleared and the rain stopped, signal was made to head south, the wind being east-southeast. At midday we took the sun and found our position to be latitude  $29^{\circ} 28'$ , and longitude  $297^{\circ} 7'$ .

#### June 14th.

From yesterday till today: at six of the afternoon, signal made to set the course N. E. by N., with the wind east-southeast. At this hour there was a flurry of rain. At sunset seventeen vessels were in sight, the two small ones that were seen this morning having been unable to come up. The night continued calm, and the currents proving more powerful than the wind, we cast anchor in twelve and a half fathoms of water at half past one in the morning. At six, signal to make sail was set, which we all did, with the course S. S. W.; wind east-southeast, which all sixteen vessels executed. At 8:00 land was seen at a distance of four leagues and a half, continuous coast. At midday the sun gave us  $29^{\circ}$  latitude and at the same time we recognized that we were off the bar of Mosquito Inlet, for which reason we set our course N. N. W.

#### June 15th.

From yesterday till today: at six of the afternoon, the packet boat "Diligent" was signalled to come up within speaking distance and ordered to press all sail and hasten to reconnoiter the bar of Matanzas and inform us by cannon shot and to hoist a signal lantern for our guidance; and that as soon as she should be off the bar of Saint Augustine, she should anchor, and from time to time make a smoke signal. We continued with the rest of the vessels on the same course and at one o'clock in the morning anchored east and west on a line with the tower of St. Anastasia in twelve fathoms of water. As soon as it dawned we discovered at anchor the seven vessels which had been missing. They had succeeded in getting in two days

before, so that we were finally all reunited. At 8:00 there came alongside a boat from the garrison to take ashore the second in command, Don Francisco Rubiani and myself. The officer who came off told us that on the 5th, the first division of small vessels that had set out from Havana on the first day, having run into an English frigate, our galley called upon her to show her colors and as she failed to do so, we cleared for action and opened fire on her with our guns, to which the frigate made no answer, and under her courses alone, advanced upon our galley, and prepared to attack her. But this design was perceived, and the wind being fresh, the galley rejoined the convoy under a signal to press on all sail; but her commanding officer seeing that the Saint Augustine sloop, in which were embarked the sub-lieutenant and the artillerymen of Havana, was far astern, gave orders to stick close to the sloop and resist the launch and boat of the hostile frigate, which she had just put overboard and was directed to cut off two schooners which were somewhat delayed behind the remainder of the convoy. As the wind continued to freshen, the galley sent a boat with the ensign and ten men of his garrison to re-enforce the aforesaid schooners. In fact, the launches of the Englishman had come alongside to board, but were by the help of the officer and ten men just mentioned, formally beaten off in the three attempts that they made. In this affair we suffered no damage, except that Don Francisco Molina, the lieutenant of the militia of Guanabacoa, was wounded in the thigh. The hostile ship, seeing that her launches had not succeeded in their attempt, now directed them to attack the Saint Augustine bilander and the launch from the convoy sent by the commanding officer of the galley to support the vessels that were far astern. Although the utmost defense possible had been made, they were unable to resist the fire of the ship which was at anchor in three fathoms of water, and so ran ashore, the sub-lieutenant, Don Domingo de la Cruz, having been killed in the action by a gun-shot, as well as the corporal, Manuel del Pino, by another. When they saw our people had got ashore, the enemy leaving their boat, swarmed over the bilander in order to loot the cargo which they supposed she carried. From the shore, we opened fire on them, encouraged by seeing that the English boat had sunk in the surf on the shore, and assisted by two Indians who happened to be fishing, and who had come up at the sound



of the guns. We succeeded in overcoming our adversaries who, after a moment or two of struggle, asked for quarter. Of the English in the boat, six were wounded and nine unhurt. The ship when it saw her people captured set sail. The dragoons who went to the help of the bilander were clever enough on going ashore to take their arms with them and from the shore diverted the hostile launches, so as to permit the artillerymen also to go ashore. Without this, the affair would not have succeeded. The prisoners have been brought to this place and among them, the officer in command, who is a brother of Captain Makay. From these we learned all about the fight and that the ship is one of the men-of-war of Carolina. I have had word of mouth with one of them but have learned nothing more than what we already know. In respect of the condition of affairs in Saint Augustine, I also learned that the day before our arrival a schooner had allowed itself to be sighted on the north and that she had changed her course as soon as she had seen the seven vessels at anchor. At one o'clock of the afternoon, the second in command, Don Francisco de la Peña and I went ashore, and we passed the rest of the day informing ourselves of the state of the preparations of this place.

#### June 16th.

Today we convened the pilots, white as well as Indian, and examined them carefully in regard to everything we should know for the purpose of our expedition. Later we held council, the commanding officers and the naval ensign, Don Francisco de la Peña, in which we agreed upon the method of attacking the north and south entrances of St. Simon's in order to cut off the communication between the various stations of the enemy, deciding to detach three galliots with their canoes to the more northerly entrance and two to enter by the Bar of Whales; these two to post themselves within the river between the Fort of St. Andrew and Frederica. Today we had squalls from the north-east and more or less water was sent on board, in spite of the fact that all the launches were busy unloading stores.

#### June 17th.

Another council was held between the commanding officers and Don Francisco de la Peña, in which was discussed the question of the point at which we should disembark

to invade the Isle of St. Simon; and after various reflections upon the matter, and weighing all the circumstances with the greatest attention, it was unanimously agreed that the disembarkation should take place on the east coast at the most sheltered point of the shoals north of the Bar of Gualquini and that from this point a cordon should be formed with part of the troops to reach as far as the careening ground in order to maintain free communication within the river with our ships and to receive supplies and whatever else might be needful from that point in full security. It was further agreed that the ships and the remaining vessels should enter in good order and force the hostile battery, and should string themselves across the river of the harbor in the formation to be prescribed by the senior naval officer, Don Antonio Castañeda, and that afterward operations should conform to the turn of events.

I caused lists to be given to me of the troops, the convicts, the Indians and the negroes of the garrison, the first being composed of five pickets of the re-enforcement and of one of the garrison, well equipped; of ninety convicts, of fifty-five Indians and of fifteen negroes, all armed. Then I promptly made the lists of distribution of all these classes according to the capacity and quality of the vessels and they were so allotted.

We continued today sending as much water as we could on board, having regard to the necessities of the vessels and especially those of the royal frigates. Today we had squalls from the northeast and some of them gave us real concern, by preventing communication and because our vessels were so completely exposed out beyond the bar. Our arrangements were thus delayed.

Today we saw a schooner off in the north and the commanding officer Don Antonio Castañeda, made signal to the Honduran ship to chase her, and after some time, she declared herself to be English and put her boat overboard and sent it to us with the French captain who was captured on this bar at the beginning of March of this year, with three Spanish prisoners and a negro of Espinosa's. Don Diego Ogletorp was returning these people with a letter to the Governor of St. Augustine, with directions to leave these prisoners at that place. I learned from the French captain that the schooner in which he had come is the same that was seen on the fourteenth; that on account of the bad weather she had not approached the shore to carry out the

order of Ogletorp and that having recognized our sloop, the English captain had taken the resolution to leave aboard of her both the French captain and the prisoners. These declared that they had been kept confined and deprived of all communication. The French captain, a reasonably just, fair man, had been kept on board of the bilander which, from the description he gave, is the one from this place which they captured after it had come to anchor in the river of St. Simon. He was not permitted to set foot on shore more than twice, when he was taken before a Board, presided over by a Doctor, to make a declaration in respect of certain effects and bilanders. These he lost, for the verdict was adverse although it was established that he had come to bring supplies to the garrison. In spite of the closeness of the confinement in which he was kept, they nevertheless treated him with the greatest distrust as though he had been an enemy. He understood that Ogletorp had not the forces to resist ours because, all told, they have not more than six hundred English, divided between troops and farmers, and that these are distributed in different posts. He relates further that the battery of the city or town of Frederica is dismounted and he reports the deep poverty in which they are living, without fresh meat, the soldiers without money and without any relief, except that a French officer has a few sheep and cattle. The negro of Espinosa, however, enjoyed a little liberty and says that a storm and heavy rains have gradually destroyed the battery at the entrance of Gualquini, so that he saw it, at least so he says, fallen over on one side. On asking the French captain what opinion Ogletorp's people had formed on seeing our seven vessels anchored in front of the bar, he said, that they thought it was the privateer, Estrada (who has as yet not come in from his cruise), with a few prizes; and that the captain of the English man-of-war, whom a few days before he had met, had told them of the combat which he had had with our galley and the boats of the first division, and that he had given them an account of the prisoners which the Spaniards had taken from them at the Bar of Mosquitos, telling them that they had come with stores for the garrison escorted by the galley; so that it seems they have not perceived the purpose for which our expedition is intended. The letter of Ogletorp to the Governor reduces itself to communicating to him the fact that he is returning the prisoners aforementioned, claiming credit

for having rescued them from the power of the Indians who had captured them; and to saying that the others which he holds in his power must, by order of the king, his master, be sent to London, Don Romualdo Morales being of the number; and makes frivolous excuses for not having before given an answer to our Governor.

June 18th.

We drew up plans of battle, divided the troops into columns, and selected the reserve; the three naval lieutenants, Don Vicente Quintta, Don Carlos Regio, and the Marquess de Casinas, were appointed to take over as many other pickets\* belonging to the Captains Don Bernardo Quena and Don Gregorio Bermejo, on duty as regimental staff captains,\*\* and that of Don Francisco Palafox, chosen as aide-de-camp by the commanding general. Ballast was sent out to the frigate, Escalera, assigned to the fleet by direction of the commanding general and in agreement with his royal officers and the agents of the Royal Exchequer. Besides we continued to send out water and I made a distribution of cartridges, at the rate of twenty rounds for the disembarkation, and ordered them to be distributed to each vessel by the adjutants.† I also ordered the issue of 183 muskets and bayonets to the militia but these orders could not all be carried out because there was not time during this day on account of the great distance to be covered and because the tide did not serve. The supply of water has continued and the ballast for the frigate of Escalera. I ordered the negro of Espinosa to be held a prisoner with directions that he should be allowed to speak to no one because I suspected some knavery.

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\* The *piquete* at the beginning of the XVIII century, was a provisional and temporary company forming up on the left, and made up of men drawn from all the companies. Later in the text it has its regular meaning of picket, i. e. guard.

\*\* *Sargentos mayores*, [or mayores, in modern form]. The *sargento mayor* was charged with duties of administration, accountability, inspection and discipline. He took rank after the captains, but they nevertheless were under his orders in matters relating to his office. The title is rather that of an office than of a grade. There is no English equivalent.

† *Ayudantes*, in all probability the assistants of the *sargentos mayores*, who were called *ayudantes*. The term used in the translation "adjutant," must not be taken to mean what we actually understand by it in the military service, but is used in a more general way. Strictly speaking we have no English equivalent for *ayudante*, any more than we have for *sargento mayor*.



June 19th.

I have drawn up the order of disembarkation and the stores have been transported to the frigate of Escalera for the troops which are embarking, namely, the detachment of Don Gregorio Aldana. The schooner, Guaraia, has succeeded in entering this port. It has on board a part of the supply of stores for the schooners and other vessels of the garrison [of Saint Augustinel]. The baggage of the officers of the pickets has been ordered on board, and the supply of water and ballast to the boats has continued with the greatest energy, each of these being about completed.

Today we saw a schooner to which chase was given, by order of the senior naval officer, by the bilander of Fide and the Honduran. They did not succeed in overtaking it, but we have formed the opinion that it is the same one which brought the Frenchman and prisoners sent by Oglethorpe and that it has come to spy us out and observe our movements.

June 20th.

While we were completing the distribution of stores, I passed the day writing to the Captain General of Havana, giving his Excellency an account of all that had passed up to the present day. Orders have been given for the embarkation tomorrow afternoon of the troops of the garrison, and that they should set out at the first tide and come to anchor near the flagship, in order that each may receive its sailing instructions from the naval commander and that there may be nothing more to do than to put to sea. Today we saw a brigantine which we have decided must be that of Estrada, because it seems suspicious that so large a vessel off this bar could have disappeared. We are copying out the order of disembarkation in order that each one of the vessels may have its own copy.

June 21st.

Yesterday we finished supplying the vessels of the garrison with their proper stores. The watering of the ships, too, has been finished. At dawn, we saw a brigantine which we decided to be the same as that seen yesterday; and in fact, at one o'clock of the afternoon it anchored off our bar, and we discovered it to be that of Estrada. At six of the afternoon the ship's writer came ashore with a letter from the said Estrada, giving us an account of what had happened on his cruise. He reports having captured a

schooner of rice which has already arrived here and a packet boat, and reports further having been attacked by a Carolina war vessel on the third instant at about six of the afternoon, when the combat opened; that it lasted until midnight and that each damaged the other more or less, with the loss on the part of the Spaniards of one man killed and four wounded; among them, the captain in the hand, the lieutenant in the head, and two sailors. As for the loss of the English, he knew nothing. He judges merely that the damage must have been great because the fire of all sorts which he opened on him was incessant, and because the Englishman, dropping astern, was the first to cease the combat, so that this action may be compared to that which Don Pedro Goycochea had with the English frigate between the islands of San Domingo and Porto Rico, because the circumstances were almost the same. He also says that he has learned from prisoners that two hundred sailors have been sent from Boston to re-enforce the fleet of Admiral Vernon which it is known was occupied, according to current reports, before Cartagena; and that it was common rumor that additional forces were to come out to join those of Ogletorp and that if these should arrive, he would doubtless use them before St. Augustine; that Carolina was not of a mind to give the help which Ogletorp was seeking, unless there should be some order from the King to that effect, and the command of the expedition committed to some other chief.

The brigantine comes in short of meat and for that reason cannot form part of the convoy; only as soon as it shall have entered, we shall try to shift its arms and equipment to the guard schooner, and if Captain Estrada shall have recovered from his wound, we shall give him the command of her. This night we had squalls, winds and showers.

June 22nd.

Frequent rains, squalls and thunderstorms have today impeded the embarkation of the troops, nor was Estrada's brigantine able to come in; and as the horizons indicated foul weather, all the pilots were assembled and gave their opinion that the vessels should not set out, but should remain until tomorrow when the embarkation would take place and the ships put forth, but only if the weather should be good.

In a gazette from Boston, brought by Estrada, there is a ridiculous article as follows: It says that a gentleman,

of Georgia, who had arrived in Boston on the 26th of March, had given trustworthy news that General Ogletorp with eight hundred men had gone to lay siege to St. Augustine, that among these men he had three hundred Indians who had resolved to burn the place; and he added that the motive of Ogletorp's expedition was that he had got news that the Spaniards were weak and in great need of stores, caused by the presence of Admiral Vernon's fleet in the waters of Cuba.

June 23rd.

Although we had thought that today we could set forth, the morning dawned with a strong wind from the north-east, accompanied by squalls and showers, and the water on the bar had become so rough that it was impossible to cross it; notwithstanding which two attempts were made, in order to bring in the brigantine of Estrada, which is causing us concern, on account of its bad condition. It fired a few guns of distress but it was not possible to reach it. At ten of the morning, we had the unhappy news that Father Domingo, chaplain of the packet boat "Diligente," and a sailor of its crew, who were going on board, had been drowned at the exit of the bar, but that fortunately the vicar general of the expedition had miraculously saved his life by happily seizing hold of the launch and keeping himself on it until she came ashore. We have also seen ashore on the beach a boat without knowing which boat it is, nor how many people have been drowned. This afternoon it became calm so that the Commanding General assembled the commanding officers and naval officers and the pilots of the garrison, and requested that each should give his opinion in respect of our sallying forth, as it was important that our trip should be short, and clear that the inconveniences of delay would be serious; in general, each person should give reasons for and against. The pilots were unanimous in declaring that it was not possible to cross the bar as long as the sea was still up, agitated as it was by the squalls and wind that had prevailed. After various reflections on the subject, and after taking into account the fact that the small boats, which were to follow the fleet without losing land from view were absolutely necessary to the success of our operations, and therefore should not expose themselves to separation from the convoy, on account of the contrary winds that had been blowing, and the great variation of



the weather, and considering further that the journey from this point to the hostile coast was so short, it was decided to be absolutely necessary that we should set out in settled weather. Accordingly, all minds were of the opinion that we should wait until things were safe and that if the wind should shift tomorrow we should go out. With this opinion, the order was given that at the beat of the drum everyone should go on board his ship.

[End of Arredondo's Journal.]

DETAILS OF WHAT OCCURRED IN THE PRESENT EXPEDITION, ENTRUSTED TO THE CARE OF BRIGADIER DON MANUEL DE MONTIANO, FROM THE 15TH DAY OF JUNE, ON WHICH THE CONVOY ARRIVED FROM HAVANA AT ST. AUGUSTINE, THE WHOLE BEING CONTAINED IN A JOURNAL, KEPT BY THE MARQUESS OF CASINAS, ETC.

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Colonel Don Francisco Rubiani and the Engineer-in-Chief, Don Antonio Arredondo, were immediately put ashore and set to work to draw up the plan of battle, giving at the same time directions to provide the vessels with water. As, on account of the distance and difficulty of crossing the bar, the dispatch desirable in this case is almost impossible, our departure has been greatly delayed. Moreover, we wished to wait in order to determine the effects of the moon, in respect of which, an unfavorable forecast had been made.

The intervening time was spent, however, in inspecting all the tools and implements and ammunition brought by the vessels of the convoy for the purpose of adding to them, if necessary, from those in the garrison, and so it was discovered that the nine hundred water jars were defective, which it was decided to repair along with the smaller vessels of all the ships. On the 26th the pickets of this garrison embarked, 600 strong, after the Lord Bishop had preached them a sermon. On the 28th the commanding officers went on board, but a strong wind having come out of the west-northwest, and maintained itself until the 30th, the smaller boats, such as launches, pirogues and galliots, which carried water for only four days, were compelled to return to shore to renew their supply. This delayed our departure, which finally took place the first of July at 7:00 in the morning, with wind east-southeast. We had determined in orders and arranged that the disembarkation should take place outside of the Port of Gualquini, and beyond the range of its guns, but in consequence of the


representations made by Don Antonio Castañeda and of the excellent reasons he gave in favor of the advantage of forcing the port, orders were given to this end. The convoy was composed of fifty-two vessels, which remained together only the following day, because the wind coming on from the west-northwest, with considerable force and raising a considerable sea, four galliots and the pirogues were compelled to seek the shelter of the coast as best they could; and as the wind held with great tenacity in the west, north and the northwest, and as there were frequent squalls, it resulted that various vessels were separated from the convoy; of these, two pirogues filled with Indians and convicts succeeded in returning and were taken in tow; one by the pink, San Lorenzo, and the other by the frigate of Flecha.

On the 9th, having made land at sunset and the wind having fallen, we cast anchor in fourteen fathoms of water at which time we heard two cannon shots and at the change of countersign, two more, which helped us set our course for the nearest point to the Port of Gualquini, otherwise known as St. Simon.

At half past four of the afternoon on the 10th, we anchored in ten fathoms about two leagues from the coast and about three to the north of the port. All the vessels had arrived so short of water that in some of them only a pint could be given out; there being none among the thirty-three which had succeeded in anchoring in these waters which could give any help unless it was the flagship and the packet boat, which was ordered to make a return of its water supply with orders to give none out. Water was issued every day by the flagship in half rations.

The enemy made a show at various times of sallying forth from the port as far as the range of the guns of their castle. Five bilanders would come out and anchor and then return after a short time. In these attempts or observations they passed the entire afternoon as well as in firing various guns, which we inferred was for the purpose of testing their batteries. We, ourselves, did nothing else but send out Don Antonio Arredondo in the boat of the flagship to reconnoiter the shore and make soundings in order to determine if our vessels could get closer in shore, and thus facilitate the disembarkation, in case we should find it convenient to attempt it here. Having noticed before sunset that a launch had set out from the port and was





This map reproduced from the original in the possession of W. J. DeKenne, Wormsloe, Ga.

pressing forward under sail and oar in the direction of our flagship, she ran up the English ensign and pennants, the other vessels of the convoy doing the same thing, but nothing came of it, for in a short time the aforesaid launch retired. At 8:00 in the evening, the launch of the packet boat having met the boat of the flagship which had sallied forth for the purpose of sounding, they fired on each other until a mutual recognition caused the fire to be stopped, fortunately without any damage having occurred on either side. During this night, we heard from time to time a few hostile cannon shots of the enemy.

On the 11th, the galley joined and a bilander, one of those which had fallen out of the convoy, as well as a barge. The wind continuing fresh from the W. W. S. W. and S. W. with frequent squalls and high seas, prevented our entrance. Our desire to execute this movement increased with the complaints of the lack of water. This want was met in the manner already given, for no water could be got from the shore, as the enemy observed our every movement, and we should have exposed ourselves to loss. This day nothing special occurred, unless it was the usual gun shots at the change of countersign and guard mounting: there were some others too during the course of the day.

On the 12th, the day dawned fair and so the commanding general set the signal to begin the disembarkation. With this end in view, a few boats with troops on board set out to take a position astern of the flagship, when there came up a squall so violent that it was only with much labor and difficulty that the vessels were able to resume their positions. We now recognized that any wind from the outside, even one blowing only a short time, raised a great sea and surf; that we were compelled to keep our vessels at a great distance from shore because there was not sufficient water closer in for the larger ones; further, that the absence of the launches, boats and pirogues from the garrison of St. Augustine as well as of the four galliots which the weather had separated from us, made an orderly landing impossible. Therefore, Don Antonio Castañeda announced it as his opinion that the port should be forced, adding to the excellent reasons already given, the no less excellent consideration that our vessels were in strong peril and exposed to some fatal damage, in consequence of the severity of the season which gave us no hope



of anything but bad weather. In consequence, it was determined to force the port and to wait for this purpose for suitable weather. The winds continued west-south-west and west, with great strength and tenacity, raising a heavy sea and accompanied by squalls until the fifteenth, when we hoisted anchor to challenge the fort. The wind having fallen, we anchored closer in, having gained something like two leagues. Until that particular day, nothing special occurred unless it was the continued clamor for water, a need that was met by the flagship and the packet boat. The enemy continued his practice of firing his guns at the change of the countersign, when they mounted the guard, except the fourteenth day, when from ten in the evening until eleven, many flashes were seen on the beach and from eleven till twelve many cannon shots were heard, as many as fifty having been counted. Considerable doubt existed as to what could have occasioned so unusual a thing, but according to the best of our inferences, we decided that it must be our four galliots cannonading Fort San Pedro.

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JOURNAL FROM THE DAY WHEN THE PORT OF GUALQUINI, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS ST. SIMON, WAS FORCED.

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July 16th.

At seven in the morning, the entire convoy hoisted anchor, and as there was not water enough, anchored at the entrance of the port at a distance of a league and a half to wait until the tide should rise and thus make the entrance surer. The galley and two galliots accordingly were ordered to sound the channel and while so employed were fired on by the enemy. This fire they returned without having received any damage. They then withdrew, having been recalled by the commanding general at three in the afternoon, because now we had had two days of a growing tide with a fresh wind astern and a smooth sea. We sailed straight into the harbor, following the pre-arranged order, and using as buoys the galley and the galliots which had been sent forward for this purpose. These, as soon as the flagship had passed them, used all diligence to get in closer

and open fire under the guns of the fort, and of a man-of-war schooner, and of four bilanders which were echeloned out from it. From this time, the enemy began to answer, maintaining the fire with the greatest intensity from the time the flagship entered until the last vessel passed. This vessel was the pink of Parreño, which unfortunately had gone aground under the fire of the enemy, who continued to fire incessantly during the time of one sand glass; but the tide rising, the boat got off, having lost only one man killed and three wounded and received much damage in its hull and two cannon shots between wind and water. The whole convoy was at anchor inside the harbor at half after five of the afternoon, and it was discovered that the total damage received in the rest of it was confined to the pink of Acosta, three men killed and one wounded: to the pink hospital, Lieut. De Berroa wounded; in the bilander, one wounded; in the galley, three. In a few vessels some of the foremen had been cut down and the bilander of Don Pedro de La Madrid had had its mast shot away. As we feared that the enemy might during this night bring up some guns, and after constructing a battery on the shore opposite the point where the vessels were anchored, do them some damage, we decided to land the troops immediately, to which end the commanding general at six o'clock set a signal. It being now after sunset, as many as eighteen boats, most of them very small, now pushed off from the flagship. Some of these contained only six men each, because the sea and wind being contrary allowed no more.\* The three barges, however, brought off the companies of grenadiers, but these came last of all on account of the struggle against contrary winds and tides, landing three hours after every one else. This first landing of 500 men was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Don Antonio Salgado. There was no resistance, but on account of the night there was some disorder which may always be expected on such occasions. Fifty men, all told, had disembarked by seven in the evening, the rest having come on immediately afterward, except the men in the launches. After setting foot ashore, the troops formed up in three ranks, throwing out advanced sentinels and

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\* These words are followed in the MS. by the expression "*en los cortabugues*". The meaning of this compound word is unknown; the word itself can be found in no Spanish dictionary. In copying it, the scribe has made an erasure, as though he were not sure himself of the original.

posting a few pickets in advantageous positions. The movement was supported by the galley, galliots and packet boat, which before the boats took on the men, swept the shore and beach with their fire, and the immediate point, where the landing was to be, maintaining the fire until the men had gone ashore. At ten o'clock came the companies of grenadiers; and at half past eleven the commanding general, Don Manuel Montiano; the second in command, Don Francisco Rubiani; and the Chief of Staff and Engineer-in-Chief Don Antonio Arredondo. At this time there must have been ashore about a thousand men who, as they continued to arrive, formed up, as already stated. Between ten and twelve, we saw a few fires started by the enemy, which as far as we could make out, seemed to be three bilanders and something else larger. From the great blaze which arose, we thought this last must be some powder magazine which they had blown up. At this hour, came the Indians who had been sent out to reconnoiter. These declared that they had entered a few houses at some distance from the fort but had found them unoccupied; they brought back with them a few trifles, such as dishes and fruit. Nothing especial occurred this night, nor did we undertake any movement, nor did we observe anything else on the part of the enemy, than what has already been set forth. This disembarkation continued until daylight.

#### July 17th.

At two, we sent out the Indians again. They returned at four, with the news that the enemy had abandoned the fort and bringing back with them a few weapons and some merchandise from a bilander, which the enemy had left loaded with supplies of some value. The companies of grenadiers were now sent out to occupy the said fort, and at six o'clock the entire body took up the march along the beach where we recognized the three bilanders that had been burnt, whose cargo must have consisted of flour and meat, because we found many barrels on the beach. These stores however profited but few, for in their keen desire to find stuff of any value whatever, the Indians had spoiled them; recognizing that the same thing had happened to the armed bilander at the hands of the said Indians as well as of the sailors who had sacked it, an officer was detached with a guard to preserve whatever he could, and orders were given to the agent of the exchequer to make an inventory





Chart for the Entrance of Qualquini, River of Saint Simon, lying in north latitude 31

#### Legend

- Channel leading over the bar
- its depth in fathom 2\* diminishes to 3 at half tide.
- Settlement fortified by a battery of 16 guns, 8 pounders, and 11 houses of boards and palms, called Fort Frederica
- The River of Saint Simon leading to the town of Frederica.
- Carreening ground
- Road joining the settlement and carreening ground
- Tidal inlets
- River leading to the Bar of Whales.
- Island of Saint Simon
- Island of Sparrow Hawks or of Whales.
- Sawmill of the English
- N. Water, good but turbid
- Look out much of logs.
- Bakery

\* This symbol does not inter-pretation, it does not appear on the chart

\*\* The letter E does not appear on the chart probably the copyist's error

This map is one fourth size of a tracing of the original map in the Spanish Archives at Seville

#### Legend of the Scale—

Scale  
30 Toises.

Duplicate. Havana, May 15, 1737.

Don Antonio de Arredondo



of whatever should be found. Similarly, on finding that the schooner and man-of-war had succeeded in escaping during the night, the naval commander, Don Antonio Castañeda placed the captain of the galley, Don Domingo de la Cron, under arrest, for having failed to execute the order given him to approach the man-of-war as soon as the landing should have taken place, and fire upon him during the rest of the night in order to prevent his escape. We found on the beach an Englishman badly wounded in the back by a gunshot, who said that he was the captain of the bilander that had a cargo. He declared that Obletorp had retired to Frederica with five hundred men and that he himself could give no account of Frederica because he had never been there, since it was only a few days since he anchored in Gualquini. This prisoner was sent on board the hospital ship to be cured.

The troops had now got up to the fort and orders were given to reach the northern entrance by marching under the cover of some tall and thick live oaks found here and also of the plantations or settlements of neat houses which surround the neighborhood. The soldiers were forbidden under pain of death to go more than two hundred paces beyond their posts. Inside the fort, we found another Englishman, a sailor, who could give no more account of things than the wounded man. We also found another man dead, killed by our Indians, who, according to their custom, had scalped him. These declared that they had done this because he had resisted them with his sword. The fort is made wholly of earth, composed of four curtains, with a salient in the midst of each. It has a ditch and a good stockade with a glacis, and on the glacis, joined to the stockade, a parapet of barrels filled with earth. There were besides a few huts and some large magazines, one of which had been blown up, for we came upon three burnt eighteen-pounders, imperfectly spiked, whose carriages were of such especial construction and so well designed that two men sufficed to maneuver them; one of these had been dismounted by a cannon shot from one of our vessels. We also found six six-pounders, five of which had been imperfectly spiked, and one left unspiked; and inside of a budge-barrel 190 loaded handgrenades, and a number of musket balls; among the remains of the magazines that had been burnt, we found various kinds of iron wares, shovels, picks and some barrel hoops.



From the fort to a block house, which is at the entrance of the harbor, there is a level stretch of country, more or less elevated, which commands and looks out on the beach, and the rim or entrance of the woods. This stretch could contain eight or ten thousand men. Here we found six lines of houses in the form of a camp; among these were sixty distant only one pace from one another. These we were able to save, because we succeeded in preventing disorder on the part of the soldiers who, without having received orders to that effect, had set fire to sixty other houses along the lines just spoken of and to four magazines of supplies. The block house is made of earth with a body of oyster shell, whitewashed and resembling stone work. It is composed of two curtains, and of an arc of circle on the side which overlooks the entrance of the port. In it we found a shell mortar, nine burnt-out handgrenades, a magazine and some huts, in whose remains we found a few grenades, bullets and other ammunition. Beyond this house, at a short distance and in front of it, had been constructed a battery. This battery overlooked the entrance of the port and mounted six guns, left unspiked, four six-pounders and two four-pounders. In the sack of the houses, of the camp and of the plantations, there had been some disorder, as is usually the case on these occasions, in consequence of which we lost some cattle and goats and considerable quantities of rich wines, oils, beer, fine butter, cheeses and other delicacies, to say nothing of a great supply of hard tack, salt meat and flour. These, which had been all burnt, might have been very useful for our maintenance. We continued our march to the terrain between the two forts where we took up a formation in the shape of a hammer, sending from this point two guards, one to each fort; and having announced to the troops that whenever there was a call-to-arms, the site just mentioned should be the assembling point, orders were given to return to the sixty houses which we had found in the camp.

July 18th.

At six in the morning, Don Sebastian Sánchez, with one of the companies of the garrison of St. Augustine and a picket of forty men was sent out to reconnoiter the road to the careening ground, as he was considered well fitted for this duty. Similarly Don Nicholas Hernández with twenty-five men of his company and the forty Indian

scouts,\* was dispatched along the road through the country to Frederica, the purpose being to select, according to the information they should bring back, the best direction in which to attack that town.

At 8 o'clock we found a dragoon dead at the edge of the woods, and some other people who were accustomed to use in these parts, brought the news of having found one of our Indians dead. As some hostile Indians also brought in this news, and we ourselves heard shots fired in the wood, the troops stood to arms and orders were given to send out two pickets as outposts. At ten o'clock, came a soldier sent by Don Sebastian Sánchez with the report that he had found a very narrow trail, and that Don Antonio Barba, who was in command of the reconnoitering party had succeeded in going, say two leagues, and that nearly the entire trail was nothing but a path passing through thick woods, leading at intervals into a few savannahs or clearings of a swampy nature, and going across on a causeway made of brush wood no wider than the trail; that thus, no formation whatever was possible nor any manner of march than single file because any one leaving the brush wood would be mired; and he reported further that two miquelets\*\* and a corporal with two Indians whom they had found and carried on with them, and four grenadiers, had noticed on the path something novel, consisting of a cut-log stockade, and also here and there some brush wood arranged like a parapet, none of which they had observed before. He, therefore, halted to reconnoiter the place, and at the same time they began to fire on him from the right and the left without his being able to see anything more than the flash of discharge. This fire he undertook to return for more than one hour without knowing whom he was engaged with because of the thickness of the forest. He continued firing until he had used up all his ammunition and then retired in good order, so as not to have his retreat cut off, seeing that the ground gave all the advantage to the enemy. In this action, the two companies lost seven men killed and eleven wounded; among the killed, the ensign of the company of Havana, Don Miguel Bucardi. The militia suffered no loss, because they formed the rear guard, which was not reached by the fire of the enemy.

\* *Desplayadores*, the word is not found in the dictionaries.

\*\* According to Spanish authorities, the miquelet is the ancestor of the modern scout.

On receiving this news, the troops stood to arms and continued from this night to sleep on them in hammer-like formation. Two other advance outposts were turned out and their reserves indicated for each one.

On this day, we noticed a few pirogues going about with people of the island on board. They were waiting to pass through the channel that goes to Frederica. We sent out a little boat with six sailors through this channel to get water, but they were all killed by hostile Indians.

July 19th.

At six, the Indians were sent out to reconnoiter the forest and to see if they could find some other road through it to Frederica. At 9:00 we sent out a small boat with eight men to obtain water in a lagoon at a short distance from the shore and on the edge of the woods and not more than half a cannon shot from our camp. Two of these men were killed by hostile Indians and the remainder fled precipitately to our camp. The sailors who were on the shore withdrew when they heard the shots so close, whereupon we beat to arms and sent out two pickets, one of grenadiers along the beach, and the other through the woods. We also gave an order to the galley to come up close and fire on them. But all these orders were at once cancelled because the Indians had already withdrawn. At 12:00 our people returned without having discovered any other road than the narrow one, and without having seen any enemy. Having heard that pirogues of the Island of Frederica had been seen plying back and forth, Indians were sent out, who returned saying that there were no people in it, and that they had burnt houses which they had entered and took to be hospitals, because there were many beds and mattresses and a few saddles which they brought back. During the entire day eight or ten returned, miquelets, and a few wounded from the picket of Sánchez, besides a few disabled by the rough character of the woods; and also a few Indians who had been missing, but not one of whom had suffered any harm because they returned in complete health. All announced that they had seen Captain Sánchez beaten with blows and taken prisoner: that they knew nothing of the captain of the miquelets, Hernández.

July 20th.

At 2:00 in the morning, the captain of miquelets, Don Nicholas Hernández, came to our camp; confirming the information just given, he declared that he had tried to escape from the enemy by leaving the trail and hiding in the woods, but that in a short time he ran into two men who made him prisoner, but that he had succeeded in freeing himself from them because he recognized that they were somewhat careless, and the hope inspired by this, gave such an impulse to his valor that he succeeded in carrying out the extreme resolution of killing them both. At 6:00 we sent out the Indians to reconnoiter the woods and to find some other road to Frederica. We began to demolish the forts and to carry their guns on board, and considering the serious inconveniences resulting from not having completed our water supply through the risk to which it exposed our people, and that we had no buckets in the neighborhood of the camp or the castles, for which reason we had lost eight men, we determined to make a sufficient number to give a supply to all in the ditch of the fort; and so we have begun to complete our water supply.

At 8:00 o'clock, there took place a *junta*, at which were present Don Antonio de Castañeda, the captains of the grenadiers and of miquelets, to consider certain facts, such as the position of the trail and the difficulties of the forests. In view of the fact that they had decided, and especially the captain of miquelets, who understands woodcraft, that another road ought to be found, before undertaking to attack Frederica, and as all agreed that none other had been found, except the narrow one, and that an attack along this line was impracticable, it was decided to send the galley and the galliots on a reconnaissance through the channel that leads to Frederica, to see how much depth of water it held, and to find a point more suited for the disembarkation, and further that the engineer from St. Augustine should go out on this business.

At two of the afternoon there arrived at this port a schooner and one launch with one hundred men of the pickets of St. Augustine. These had been separated from the convoy by bad weather. As many as fifteen vessels had come together; among them, the four galliots under the command of the naval ensign, Don Francisco Pineda. He had arrived within sight of this port, and not meeting any of our vessels, which had within twenty-four hours



been sent off by the staff officer who happened to be in command of that post,\* he had considered it proper to maintain himself in those waters and await news of the arrival of our convoy at Gualquini. On seeing that this news was delayed, he determined to send on the vessels already mentioned,\*\* to notify the commanding general of all these matters, and that in passing he had engaged Fort San Pedro for one hour; and that one of his galliots had been attacked by four large pirogues filled with troops, one of which he had sunk near the shore where her people succeeded in saving themselves.

At 4:00 of the afternoon the entire body of troops formed up for a review which was over at 6:00, when we posted anew the usual guards in the form which has always prevailed, namely, that of a hammer. At prayers we saw out on the beach in the neighborhood of the fort a few Indians, wherefore we strengthened its guard and marched out the supports to re-enforce the outposts; our Indians sallied to explore but returned in two hours without having met anybody. During this night, there were two false alarms so that the entire body remained under arms.

### July 21st.

At 5:00 in the morning, we began to entrench the outposts with barrels of earth on account of the repeated false alarms which kept the troops continuously anxious and because our camp had no protection whatever nor artillery. This had not been put ashore because we were awaiting from one day to another the arrangements to be made to march on Frederica. At 6:00 we sent out the Indians to explore the forests and at the same time we sent out a launch toward the Bar of Whales, ordering the naval ensign Don Francisco de Pineda to proceed by the interior channel, sounding the passes as far as that port. The commanding general had approved his conduct in the operations which he reported having undertaken with the convoy under his orders.

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\* What post is meant, there is no means of determining. The original passage is more or less obscure in its references. The vessels mentioned are those reported, ante under date of the 3d, as being compelled to seek shelter under the coast.

\*\* The schooner and launch.

At 4:00 in the afternoon, the galley and the galliots returned from a reconnaissance of the passes leading to Frederica. These had gone out in the morning under the orders of Naval Lieutenant Don Adrian Cantein. He declared that the channel contained enough water for all the boats, but that at a little more than half tide, the least depth he had found was 20 spans, the three vessels entering on the same front; that on arriving within cannon shot of Frederica they opened on him, apparently with four guns, eight-pounders, and fired 18 shots, all of which passed over his head, and four bombs so well aimed that they fell very close; that there is a stretch to be reached only by passing within cannon range, but that beyond they would be sheltered from fire, in a stretch of pine woods, clear, open, and level, large enough for the formation of a far greater number of troops than ours; but that he was in doubt whether the beach was firm enough for a landing because grass land was seen everywhere, and that because in this, quaking grass is usually found; that he was unable to examine into this matter because he noticed that a number of troops had passed in pirogues to the shore of the island and that they could have done him much harm by musketry fire, especially as he had received orders not to open fire himself. Our Indians returned without finding anything in the woods, having been unable to catch a prisoner or a deserter who could give us any light or any help toward forming any plans for the attack on Frederica with the accuracy that is desirable.

July 22nd.

Our Indians sallied forth at 6:00 in the morning to reconnoiter the woods, according to daily custom. As doubt exists in our minds in respect of the firmness of the ground for the landing in the channels, we determined again to send out the galley and two galliots for the determination of this matter. The commanding general turned this matter over to the senior naval officer, Don Antonio Castañeda for the next day.

During the morning there came in a miquelet, whose declaration confirms the others: thirty-six men being missing so far of the two pickets of Sánchez and Hernández. This man told us that he had come along the beach, outside of the port, and that at a short distance from the entrance he found a trench with three loaded six-pounder



guns ready to spike and that he thought this battery had been put up through fear lest we should disembark outside. This day we had no false alarm, nor did anything special occur. The Indians returned like all the rest without having accomplished anything whatever, but we should not be astonished that they should refuse to expose themselves, seeing that they are rich, for a few have more than six hundred dollars worth of loot. These are the only people who have succeeded in getting anything, being the first ones to engage in loot.

#### July 23d.

The *junta* or council appointed for the day did not take place because Don Antonio Castañeda was sick and it was put off until the following day. Today there was nothing especial. We continued demolishing the forts.

#### July 24th.

At 2:00 in the morning we were informed by our outposts that they had heard four shots and at once we heard in our camp the noise of drums, for which reason our people stood to arms and we re-enforced the outposts. At 3:00 there came into our camp a deserter, a prisoner, of the French nation, who declared that Obletorpe had been marching the entire night with 500 men with the design of surprising us, and that having heard the shots which put our camp on its guard, he thought that he was discovered and therefore withdrew, beating his drums. During this time, the deserter succeeded in making his escape. He also told how he had been compelled to take arms and that the five hundred men were made up of two hundred regular troops, two hundred militia, fifty Indians and fifty sailors; that he believed that the entire force in Frederica amounted to from nine hundred to one thousand men, and that help was expected from Boston, from which news had been received; that he [Oglethorpe] had sent all the women fifty leagues inland, and that in the affair with our two pickets, he had taken about twelve prisoners, among them, Captain Sánchez. At 8:00 in the morning, this prisoner was sent on board the Penelope. At the same time Don Antonio Arredondo held a conference with Don Antonio Castañeda on this news and to propose action that could be most rapidly taken, after all our vessels should have taken on their water.

Between 12:00 o'clock and 1:00 of this day, one or our outposts reported that five vessels had been seen to the north, apparently headed for the port. In a short time, we could make them out and having taken account of their build, seeing that they were only two or three leagues off, we saw that one was a frigate of thirty guns, and that there were two packet boats, a brigantine and a sloop. This, together with the occurrence of the morning (although this, like the arrival of the French prisoner and his declarations, was considered an artifice), caused us to fear not so much what was involved, nor the vessels in sight, as the vessels which might follow in greater force. These reflections were held to justify our resolution to withdraw, which was forthwith carried out in the best form and order possible. After having collected everything in the camp without leaving anything that had been disembarked, the commanding officers were taken in the galliots to the Island, named after the castle, facing Gualquini, the Penelope having been the first to cross after collecting her crew; the plan was to journey to the interior channels over the bars of San Pedro and San Juan to Florida, demolishing on the way the forts of Bajeses and San Pedro. Orders were consequently given the troops to disembark and march two leagues in order to arrive in front of the castle or fort of Bajeses, and to all the small boats to pass through the said channels as soon as the tide should permit, in order to cross over the troops to the said fort which was situated on another island in front; but because the orders were misunderstood, some confusion resulted, for some entire pickets and a few scattered men not having come up with any boats, followed the convoy of Casteñeda. About fifteen hundred men remained this night on the island in question.

The naval commander Don Antonio Casteñeda ordered the galley to approach the shore and endeavor, if it could do so without exposing its crew, to put its small boat overboard for the purpose of spiking the two guns lying on the shore and to burn certain houses if it were decided there were no enemies in the camp. This was done, for we saw them burning, as we did some hostile boats which could not be manned. Don Adrian Cantein carried these orders out. At the same time this commander made his dispositions for receiving the enemy, drawing up his strong vessels in line and withdrawing more to the interior of the

port those that were unarmed. He had determined to set out with the tide on the following day if the weather permitted, to attack the enemy's ships outside in case they had not first come in themselves. At sunset we saw them standing for the outside and it was in this state that we left the houses of Gualquini at the time of our withdrawal.

#### July 24th.

At 3:00 in the morning, the troops took up the march and continued along the beach until 7 o'clock, when we began to make out a few of our vessels, for which reason we halted in order to wait for all of them, because now we could see that they were at anchor solely to wait for the slight tide. At about four of the afternoon a schooner having come up, the company of grenadiers of the battalion of Havana went on board of her with the Indians in order to cross over to the fort of Bajeses which was considered to be abandoned by the enemy, so that having taken possession of it, all disorder should be prevented, and the place preserved with its magazines until the entire body of troops could be brought up, and other directions should be given. At about 6:00 of the evening, the vessels which had been at anchor moved up, excepting those of Truxillo, Oyarbidos, and Camejo. These, on account of their size, and of the stores they had aboard, the last one carrying the guns and mortars of the enemy, drew too much water, for which reason they were compelled to take up their course outside. This was verified by the adjutant Don Albaro, who on account of the anxiety caused by this matter, was sent out to determine the reason why the said boats held back. He returned with the information that he had seen them all put out with the vessels under the command of Don Antonio Castañeda, the last one being the packet boat of the king, for which reason and because it had seen a few hostile people on the beach, it fired a few shots. We began to embark the troops, but could not finish because night had fallen.

#### July 26th.

We continued embarking the troops until 6:00 in the morning, when they were all on board. We waited at this hour until the four galliots, under command of Naval Ensign Don Francisco de Pineda, should join the whole collection of our vessels; and having noticed the absence of

the remainder of his convoy, we learned that they had withdrawn with the troops they had on board to Florida, by an order which they had to this purpose from the general and which was dispatched in his own launch from Gualquini. Proceeding thus to the Fort of Bajeses, we arrived at 8:00 in the morning and anchored, and at one and the same time all the troops began to go ashore in as good order as was permitted by the nature of the ground. We found the fort abandoned and containing only a few things, such as a four-pounder gun spiked, two swivel guns unspiked, fifty handgrenades, six empty jars and number of iron hoops. The fort is situated upon an eminence which commands the entire beach and has no other fortification than that afforded by a dense girdle of lofty and large pines and the superiority of its position. Within this enclosure was a house of limited accommodation and in an angle an underground room which appeared to be a powder magazine; about one hundred paces beyond this circle were three houses at a short distance one from the other, the largest of which, from its construction seemed to be a storehouse; the next one was a stable because it was surrounded by a fence inside of which we found fifty to sixty horses. These at first we thought we would take on to Florida with us, but as we had no means of doing so, an order was given that they should be immediately killed in order that our enemies might have a taste of the same treatment to which they had subjected us in Florida. At this very moment, however, this order was suspended until we should begin our march. The third house was immediately at the landing which showed that it was either a tavern or a low eating house. Our commanding officers took for their headquarters the house in the fort, leaving the others for the other officers. The troops went into camp at a distance of about two hundred paces from the fort in an open pine grove on level ground and more or less shady on account of the thick pines growing there. There seemed to be an abundance of water with which the men refreshed themselves; they managed to resist the scarcity of food from which they suffered on this day until the afternoon, for it occurred to some of the men to obtain relief by killing a few horses and eating their flesh. In the afternoon an issue was ordered of a little rice and of one hard tack apiece and at the same time a return was asked of the stores which were actually on board in the boats with us. This was



all the more easy to make from the fact that the stores on hand permitted us to subsist for the space of eight days and no more, because the boats that carried the reserve stores were no longer within reach. This being the state of affairs, orders were given to man the boats in proportion to their burden and naturally the issue of rations followed suit.

### July 27th.

At 4:00 of the afternoon we remarked in the direction of the entrance of the Bay of Whales, three pirogues and one launch or canoe, passing from one side to the other as though they were carrying troops; for which reason Don Antonio Arredondo proposed that the galliots should go out to stop them, and that the Indians should be put ashore to cut off the advance of any people who might be coming to the help of those who were in the fort of San Pedro; for, according to the information received from the galliots, it was known that the said castle was garrisoned, since it had fired on them the night before. But the General would not consent to this and therefore this action was not taken, but instead the order was given at about 5:00 in the afternoon for the troops to go on board. This operation was begun and carried on until three or four pickets had embarked; when the order was suspended and another one issued that everybody should march and take up a formation near the fort, where we remained all night.

### July 28th.

At dawn, the pirogues or schooners which had brought about the resolution to embark on the day before, again began to reconnoiter and for the same cause on this day we hastened a fresh embarkation, so that at about 9:00 o'clock we were all on board. At this hour we provided for the security of our vessels by the following disposition: the sloops and large schooners were to sail outside under the orders of Lieutenant Colonel Don Antonio de Salgado; and the galliots, with the remaining vessels and a number of the little boats, should proceed by interior channels to the Bar of the St. Johns River. With these were to go the Commanding General, Don Francisco Rubiani, and the Chief-of-Staff and Engineer-in-Chief, Don Antonio Arredondo, because it had been provided in advance that horses from Florida should join the detachment at the mouth of the

St. Johns River and in this way facilitate the return of the said gentlemen and officers to the garrison of St. Augustine, Florida. The time now having come to separate the vessels into these two classes, Don Antonio Salgado pointed out that inasmuch as his vessels were of no military strength, it would be proper that the galliots should convoy him out beyond the bar of the Bay of Whales but this suggestion raised considerable opposition, in which Don Antonio Arredondo took the lead, showing over and over again what inconvenience this course would cause the General, who, his mind now being made up, ordered the galliots to proceed to the point mentioned in accordance with the plan of embarkation, and that he was only waiting on them before setting out himself, and so Don Antonio Salgado put out with his convoy and succeeded in crossing the bar without having met the hostile vessels, of which he was so fearful, and the galliots returned to join the general. The wind fell at half past six and the convoy anchored about a league outside the bar.

July 29th.

At four o'clock in the morning, we hoisted anchor, the land breeze blowing, and at 9:00 o'clock, found ourselves in front of the entrance of the Bar of San Pedro and about two leagues off; at 10:00 having gone about one league more from the said mouth and at a distance slightly more than three from the fort, we began to hear a few cannon shots and remarked that these were answered by a few vessels which we could not see because they were hidden by the land. The number of rounds rose to more than seventy and we heard besides a few discharges of musketry, lasting for an hour. We then saw a few boats coming out, which from their bearing left no doubt in our minds that they were the convoy of our general. Nothing unusual occurred in the journey to the Bar of the St. Johns where we anchored because the wind had fallen.

July 30th.

At 2:00 o'clock in the morning we hoisted anchor with the wind fresh from the east-northeast. At noon we found out that we had slipped by St. Augustine six leagues and were now, thanks to a heavy squall, separated from the convoy. The currents too were now carrying us with great force to the south, so that it would have caused us



much effort to return to the said bar. Moreover, it was agreed by the captain and officers of this sloop, whose name was *El Canto*, that it was perfectly clear that the weather was such as would greatly help us to continue our voyage to the Port of Havana. This course, too, would be useful to the service of the King, because the general and other officers of high rank had been heard to say with respect to the remaining vessels that it would be of advantage to send them on as rapidly as possible on account of the disadvantage that would result from any other course, because *St. Augustine* with so many people within its limits would be called upon to make a great expenditure of stores and that it would be impossible to revictual it, considering that it would be necessary in the weather prevailing to send stores for thirty days. And even if the vessels should find it impossible to make the journey, a report would be given to the Governor of Havana so that he could himself issue the necessary orders in the case. Having considered all these things, and the fact that the campaign was over, and that we had a sufficiency of stores on board for returning the troops with which we had come out, we unanimously agreed upon the said resolution of returning straight to Havana. On this day we saw a sloop astern following in our wake, for which reason we thought it must belong to the convoy.

#### July 31st.

At 12:00 o'clock, noon, we arrived off the Bar of Mosquito Inlet and skirting the coast with but little wind, we anchored at night because it had fallen calm.

#### August 1st.

At 4:00 o'clock we hoisted anchor, with the wind to the east-southeast. Upon its veering to the southeast and falling almost a dead calm, we anchored at 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon at about six leagues from the Canaveral Channel.

#### August 2nd.

At 2:00 o'clock we set out with the wind northeast and light. We passed the Canaveral Channel at noon and the wind falling, we anchored, having rounded the *Real de la Almiranta de Chebes* and being about two leagues to the windward of the River of Ys.

## August 3d.

At 4:00 we set out with the wind east-northeast and at 9:00 o'clock rounded Casacho and anchored at 6:00 by reason of a calm.

## August 4th.

At 4:00 o'clock we set out with the wind east-northeast and at 12:00 rounded Ropa tendida. At about 6:00 of the afternoon the wind shifted to the east-southeast, and so stood fresh all night but we made no progress because of the force of the currents and so anchored.

## August 5th.

At 7:00 we turned the Inlet of Sober and at 6:00 in the afternoon were off Sega, having kept the wind all day east-southeast. At 6:00 o'clock in the morning we descried a frigate off our bow at a distance of three leagues, and, like us, at anchor through lack of wind. At 11:00 we hoisted anchor with the wind east-northeast and fresh, and coming up at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon to within less than one league we showed this frigate our colors, confirming it by a gun shot, in the belief that she must belong to our convoy because she had followed the same course as we, close in shore. It appeared to us to be the little frigate of the company commanded by Pablo Rodríguez, but as she refused to show us her colors we continued on our voyage, leaving her at sunset astern.

## August 6th.

At dawn, it was calm; we had not gained more than one league during the past night on account of the great strength of the currents. We remained at anchor this entire day and night through lack of wind. We employed a part of this day in taking on water from a lagoon close by.

## August 7th.

The calms and contrary winds continuing we remained at anchor this entire day and night.

## August 8th.

At 3:00 we hoisted our anchor with the wind east-northeast which we kept until night when, because it fell off, we anchored at the Banda del S. R. of the Rio Seco, one league.

August 9th.

At 2:00 in the morning we hoisted our anchor with the wind northeast and at 6:00 passed Ratones inlet; and at 10 anchored at the inlet to the north of Biscayne Key.

August 10th.

At 5:00 of the morning we hoisted anchor with the wind east. We passed Biscayne Key, the Candiles de la Parida, the Candiles de las Máscaras, the shoal de las Máscaras, the first Canaleja of Long Key, the Playuelas, the shoal of las Tetras with its inlets, Escribano Key, and anchored near Melchior Rodríguez at 10 of the night.

August 11th.

At 5:00 o'clock we hoisted anchor with the wind east, passed Tabanos Key, the inlets of Guimero, Old Matacumbi and Young Matacumbi, Biboras Key, Bascas Key, and at 10 of the night anchored in Bahía Honda.

August 12th.

At 5 we hoisted anchor, wind east; passed Caguamas Point, and Boca chica, and anchored at 4 of the afternoon in Key West.

August 13th.

We stayed here all day, anchored at night because of squalls.

August 14th.

Hoisted at 2 of the morning, and anchored about a half league out in Key West Channel. Hoisted anchor at 5:30, wind N. N. E. and put out through the small channel of Key West. Proceeding thus, at 10 the wind shifted to the north, at 5:30 to N. E., at 8 of the morning to E. W. and so held until 12 when it veered to the S. S. O. where it held all day, our course being S. E.

August 15th.

At six we made out the range of Camarioca; when about 6 leagues to leeward of them, the wind shifted to the E. S. E., and with our head to the south, at 5 of the afternoon we reached Bacuniaga, 5 leagues to leeward of Matanzas.

August 16th.

Dawn found us in Jaruco Inlet, 8 leagues to leeward of Havana, in which harbor we anchored at 2:30 of the afternoon.

[End of Casinas' Journal.]

### MONTIANO'S OWN REPORT.

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Sir,—

I transmit the report herewith, to the end that your Lordship place it in the hands of the Royal and Supreme Council of these Indies for their information.

Your Lordship holds me in faithful unalterable affection, always at your command, and praying Our Lord to keep Your Lordship many years.

Saint Augustine, in Florida, 3 August, 1742.

Don Manuel de Montiano, your most obedient servant, kisses your Lordship's hand.

To

Don Fernando Triviño.

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### Letter of Montiano to the King.

Sir:—

In a letter of October 31st of the past year, Don José del Campillo advised me that Your Majesty had resolved upon the formation in Havana of an expedition to lay waste Carolina and its dependencies, and that he was communicating this news to me by command of Your Majesty, to the end that I might give Lieutenant General Don Juan Francisco de Guemes y Horcasitas, Governor of Havana, all the information that I might have and that might conduce to the happy issue of these royal instructions. These, I obeyed with all the promptness demanded, and posted the results to the aforesaid Lieutenant General Governor of Havana, offering myself for any duty in the Royal Service that he might see fit to give me. In consequence he informed me in a letter of May 14, brought by an officer of that garrison [Havana] in a small boat, that he had selected me for the command of the expedition, sending me at the same time the particular charges and directions for the best advantage of Your Majesty's Service. He informed me that the

expedition was ready to put to sea, and that, although a secret council he had called of the senior officers of both Services in Havana, as well as of those of the squadron under the orders of Lieutenant General Don Rodrigo de Torres, had declared impracticable the royal intention and will of Your Majesty through lack of sufficient naval forces, yet it was agreed that at the right time some operation should be set afoot against Georgia, to indemnify us in part for the insults and perfidies attempted and committed to the injury of these Provinces, and of Your Majesty's indispensable right to them.

The convoy of ten small vessels manned by a few militiamen and escorted by a galley, sent in advance by the aforesaid Lieutenant General, fell in on June 6th with an English coastguard man-of-war of 24 guns, which with its artillery, launch, and boats, attacked a few of our vessels beforementioned. And as our galley could not go to the help of all of these, they presently found themselves in danger so great, that two of them were compelled to run ashore, one of them having lost a lieutenant of artillery and a corporal killed, and had a lieutenant of militia wounded. One of their boats tried to board a sloop of ours aground, but our troops that were on shore began to fire and so forced the crew of the English boat to ask for quarter. We thus captured one officer and 18 sailors.

On the 15th of the aforesaid month the entire expedition arrived safely off this bar [that of Saint Augustine] under the command of Colonel Don Francisco Rubiani. But on account of the scarcity of water, and because of the fierce squalls and strong winds which did us some damage, and wrecked a launch, drowning a chaplain and some sailors, I was unable to leave this port [Saint Augustine] before the 23rd of the month; and as on that very day the wind blew hard out of the northeast, I delayed my departure until July 1st, when I put to sea with all the vessels of the Expedition. I laid my course for Georgia, and reached its neighborhood on the 2d, when a furious storm beyond any human power to resist, overtook us from the southwest and scattered us all. We remained dispersed many days. The greater part of the fleet having reassembled (except 4 galliots, 4 pirogues, 2 schooners, 2 launches and 1 small boat), we anchored on the 10th in sight of the port of Gualquini, where we remained, unable to close in by reason of the contrary winds, until the 16th, when we gloriously forced the port,



with no greater loss than 5 men, against resistance by sea and land in succession.

At the entrance of the harbor was constructed a fort of sod with brick parapets, in the shape of a horseshoe, containing a bronze shell mortar, and five for smaller shells.\* It had in its neighborhood a large trench mounting 3 guns to sweep the entrance. At a distance of two musket shots, and to the west, was another fort, of square trace, with four bastions, one in the middle of each curtain, constructed of heavy timbers and of earth, and having a ditch one toise\*\* and a half wide and four feet deep. On its parapet were a few rows of barrels filled with earth, and planted with thorns, to serve as a parapet. Along the interior ran a stockaded covered way to prevent a surprise, on which were mounted 7 guns, 3 of them 18-pounders and six grenade-mortars. Between the first and this second fort they had constructed a strong trench mounting 5 guns: to the west of these works was yet another large trench of circular form, whose purpose it was to annoy us by musketry.

Within this harbor between the forts mentioned were stationed a 24-gun frigate, a schooner of 14, then a bilander of 10 guns. Behind these came a line of eight bilanders and schooners well manned to defend the entrance with musketry; but in spite of all this, we took possession of the Port and anchored at five of the afternoon.

I immediately gave orders for the disembarkation of the entire body, in order to allow the enemy no opportunity to recover from the dismay into which our triumph had thrown him. This operation was successfully accomplished without resistance. At dawn, I set out with the entire force, my intention being to advance on the first fort. I first sent out some Indians to approach and reconnoiter the state of affairs and movements of the enemy; these having returned and reported having seen no one, the Chief of Staff, Don Antonio de Arredondo, moved forward to verify the information, having with him two companies of Grenadiers which I ordered out to ensure the greater thoroughness of the reconnaissance, and to determine whether the enemy had really retired. When this was confirmed, I continued my

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\* *Granadas reales*, smaller than the *bombas*, but projectiles of the same fort.

\*\* The *toesa* (*tuesa* in MS.), a measure of length about 6.4 feet.

march to his works which I at once occupied, posting the necessary guards, and a few pickets on what appeared to be avenues of approach, in order to check any attack they might make.

The Indians and grenadiers brought in two prisoners, who confirmed the flight of General Oglethorpe to the town of Frederica, distant slightly more than two leagues from the forts of Gualquini. Although I might have overtaken him, this step did not appear to be prudent, so long as I was ignorant of the road and of the ground over which one should march with full knowledge. Accordingly, as it seemed to me advantageous to advance on Frederica along two lines at the same time, I dispatched the captain of one of the pickets of this post [Saint Augustine], Don Sebastian Sánchez with 50 men, as being acquainted with these parts, to reconnoiter the road leading to the careening ground, at which point it seemed to me that it might be more advantageous to disembark the artillery.

At the same time I sent the Captain of Miquelets, Don Nicholas Hernández, with 25 of his men and 40 Indians, to examine the road that leads directly to Frederica. It fell out that Don Sebastian Sánchez lost the trail he was to follow, and joined the Hernández party. These two continued as far as the town, in whose vicinity they were attacked by a body of English and Indians in a very narrow defile of the woods. This accident brought on inevitable disorder, in which we suffered the loss of the two captains and 11 men captured, 10 men wounded, and 12 killed. When news of this reached me, I detached three companies of grenadiers to support our troops and cover their retreat; but before the companies of grenadiers could reach the site of the action, they were attacked themselves by another ambuscade surrounding a swamp, over which the path gave passage only in single file. The Captains of Grenadiers, realizing, if they continued their efforts, that no advantage was to be gained save the sacrifice of their troops, through the impossibility of seeing who was firing on them, or of taking up any formation by reason of the nature of the ground, prudently resolved to withdraw in as good order as possible, with the loss of Don Miguel Bucareli and 6 grenadiers, who were killed.

The Captain of Miquelets, Don Nicholas Hernández, taking advantage of the fact that he had been very insecurely tied by the two soldiers who were taking him along,

succeeded in breaking loose, which the soldiers observed; on their endeavoring to make him secure by tying his arms, he gave them no chance, for like a man of valor and spirit, he rushed upon one of them and took away his sword, and with it, its owner's life, and then slew the other, thus earning his liberty and returning to our camp four days later. This Captain and some of his soldiers, although born woodsmen (*hombres de monte*), were so exhausted by the difficulties of the underbrush, that they thought they would give up the ghost before coming out on the road.

I now took these matters under serious consideration, as well as the report of the Captains of Grenadiers and our Indians, to the effect that the forest was impenetrable because of its impassable undergrowth, besides being full of swamps and lagoons. Furthermore, the representations of Don Antonio de la Atora, agent of the Exchequer, in respect of the consumption of stores, and that those to be consumed on our withdrawal should receive first thought, there being barely enough in hand to last to the end of August, gave me pause.

The tempestuous weather of August and September was also a fact of no mean weight. I was moreover compelled to take into account the naval forces then off the coast of Carolina, superior to ours. Our prisoners declared that it was commonly known that General Oglethorpe was expecting them. Our delays caused by bad weather, the action between the man-of-war and our galley and small convoy, and the fact that we had maintained ourselves on his coasts, must have convinced the General of our intention to attack him, and thus have given him time to prepare his defense. The failure of thirteen vessels, among them four galliots carrying some troops and all the sappers, to rejoin the convoy, had caused us supreme embarrassment, for without these men and the row boats, no operation was possible ashore or on the rivers within a radius of somewhat more than two leagues. Lastly, I could not overlook the special injunctions of Lieutenant General Don Francisco de Guemes y Horcasitas to consider the most important matter of assuring the withdrawal of the troops, having regard to the notable reduction that had taken place in the garrisons of both Havana and Saint Augustine.

Having therefore maturely considered all these matters, I called a council of war composed of the senior officers of the army, and having laid before them the reasons which

had led me to assemble then, I asked them to advise what we should do in the situation that faced us. They answered that there was in their opinion nothing else better than to reconnoiter the river leading to the town of Frederica, and see if there were not some place where the men and artillery could be conveniently disembarked, in order to batter the fort and town; that while this was in hand, the vessels could continue taking on water, for it was to be recollected that even if favorable terrain could be found for the disembarkation, nothing should be undertaken that would demand more than six days for its execution. The fact that we had supplies for no later than the end of August was of such gravity that we ought to think of nothing else but to withdraw to our respective garrisons, and thus avoid the dangers threatened by delay. In consequence of this advice, the Engineer Don Pedro Ruis de Olano went out with the galley and the two galliots to make the reconnaissance agreed upon, and got within musket shot of Frederica, without finding any place suitable to a disembarkation, because the bank of the river is a marsh throughout its length, and overgrown with grass; he was unable to determine whether it was quaking grass or water swamp, and it was only within cannon range that he thought there might be a clear place where he thought a landing might be possible. But on taking into account the well-recognized risk of exposing the men to much loss, especially as he had been unable to determine whether there was a battery or entrenchment or not, I resolved that it would be disadvantageous to undertake an operation so palpably dangerous. Nevertheless, I withheld my decision so far as to call a second council, principally because at dawn of this day a deserter came into camp, and declared that General Oglethorpe had been marching the entire night with 500 men to surprise us before dawn. In answer to questions intended to inform me as to the condition and forces of Oglethorpe he said they numbered one thousand, half of them regular troops of his own regiment, and the remainder settlers and Indians, that the town of Frederica was defended by a battery that commanded the river, and mounting small guns, some 18-pounders, and mortars of both and large calibre; and that on the bank of the river near the town there was a trench in which he could place his men under cover, and prevent our landing. He continued that another channel through which our vessels could easily pass was



defended by a garrisoned mortar battery. He added that the General was placing his chief trust in the thickness of the woods and the morasses. He also declared that he was expecting both men and ships, that the people of Carolina would not be long in appearing, likewise Virginians and Philadelphians, in as much as he had sent letters in all directions by reason of the suspicions excited by the affair of the galley and small convoy off Cape Canaveral, and confirmed by our long stay on his coasts.

A few hours after the arrival of the deserter, and just as the second council was about to sit, the outposts on the shore, and the men in the tops, announced that three cruisers, one bilander and a schooner were approaching the port. This information compelled me to adjourn the council, and to hold one composed only of Colonel Don Francisco Rubiani, of Lieutenant Colonel Don Antonio Salgado, and of the Chief of Staff Don Antonio de Arredondo. These all agreed that we should bend all our energies to retreat, that our fear lest Oglethorpe should attack by land while his ships did the same by sea was normal. I consequently ordered that all the troops should cross over to the island in front, in order to give our ships time to prepare, unencumbered, for the defense; and that the smaller vessels should, while I was marching ashore with the troops, enter the River of Whales, and await me on the bar of the same name, where I intended to embark and go on to the capture and demolition of Fort Saint Andrew. This was all done; the fort I found unoccupied, it had one gun, a 4-pounder, three stone mortars, a few implements, and a number of horses, which we killed. From this point, in order to improve the time while the smaller vessels were completing the task of bringing up the stores that were lacking, I arranged to detach 200 men ashore to occupy Fort San Pedro, which the night before had fired on the four galliots, launches and pirogues separated from us by the storm, and which had now rejoined; but as I was without supplies, inasmuch as the vessels that had them on board, were going outside straight to Florida, I thought the most rapid transportation possible of the troops to Saint Augustine, preferable to a delay without provisions.

I consequently commanded all the vessels to pass out by the Bar of Whales, while I with the 4 galliots, launches and pirogues took the inside of the river, in order to reconnoiter the aforesaid Fort San Pedro, and to attend to anything

PLAN



# PLAN

pour un petit FORT pour l'Isle de S. ANDRÉ  
capable de contenir outre les Magasins, des  
Barricades pour 200 hommes de garnison, & environ  
20 Chambres de familles pour quelques autres Habitans

Le Fort

AA Trois doubles rangs de Canons

B Barricades

DD Salines

E Citadelle ou Centre du Fort

F Place d'armes pour la garnison  
et le service des Soldats

GGG ports adroits pour  
abriter les navires & à  
commencer leur magasin  
de bois & les empêcher  
d'entrer dans le Fort  
sans ces petits ouvrages entrecroisés  
si on veut hommes à cheval de feu  
en fort

III Petites tranchées ou chemins  
communication entre les ouvrages &  
le Fort

KK Autre tranchée  
pour des jardins ou  
pour des pointes d'eau  
(Citadelle)



CXXII

76

St. Andrew's & Cumberland Islands

that might come up. This done, and notwithstanding the fire which they opened, and which I ordered the 4 galliots to return, I continued on my way and reached the River Saint John, where I went ashore and thence on August 1st, to this fortress [Saint Augustinel] where I found all the troops carried by the vessels that had gone outside.

During the time in which I abode in camp at Gualquini, notwithstanding the lack of sappers, I took such measures, that the troops and militia in detachments destroyed and razed the castles [i. e., forts] and batteries; that the artillery, mortars, and implements were carried aboard; that the houses in the country were burned to the number of thirty, and the planted fields laid waste; and so finished this business on the last day as regards the remainder of the settlement, say seventy houses in seven streets, that not a sign or vestige remained, to show that the place had ever been settled.

And I did the same sort of thing with the enemy's vessels, excepting two bilanders, which I manned, and put into our armada, and the war ship, which on the very night we forced the pass, under favor of the darkness, and of a storm, succeeding in escaping, in spite of the efforts of Don Antonio Castañeda to prevent its flight.

I consider that the damage done the English will amount to between 250,000 and 300,000 pesos. On the day when I went by land to the Island of Vejeces, the land wind that was blowing drove off the hostile vessels from the coast, and also took ours out, for it was the intention, suggested by me, of Don Antonio de Castañeda, commander of the Fleet, to attack the enemy. As he was unable to find them however, he set his course for Havana.

All the officers, both senior and junior, of regular troops and militia; Don Antonio de Castañeda, and the naval volunteers, have given proof of special zeal and devotion to the service of Your Majesty; and particularly Colonel Don Francisco Rubiani, Lieutenant Colonel Don Antonio Salgado, and the Engineer of the Second Class, Don Antonio de Arredondo, who discharged the functions of Chief of Staff with incessant toil. For these reasons I recommend them to the notice of Your Majesty as worthy of distinction.

I do not know, Sir, whether my conduct of affairs will meet with the royal approbation of Your Majesty, seeing that my entire effort has been to discharge the trust committed to my care with no other end than the ruin of the

enemies of the Crown, and the honor and glory of the arms of Your Majesty. These might have been better advanced had not the All Powerful, who disposes of all things, brought to naught the plan I had in mind, of sending 3 galliots under the orders of the Naval Lieutenant Don Adrian Cantein to the river of Saint Simon, and two to the river of Whales under the command of the Ensign Don Francisco Pineda, for the purpose of cutting the enemy's communications and prevent succor reaching him from the north, agreeably with the instructions of Lieutenant General Don Juan Francisco de Guemes y Horcasitas.

Nevertheless, I expect of the royal magnimity of Your Majesty, that it will deign to regard itself as having been well served in the operations under question, and that I shall have the satisfaction of receiving honors from Your Majesty, whose Catholic royal person I pray our Lord to preserve as many happy years, as Christendom may need.

Saint Augustine, in Florida. August 3, 1742.

Don Manuel de Montiano.

(flourish.)

**ORDERS FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE TROOPS IN THE  
EXPEDITION TO BE UNDERTAKEN AGAINST  
THE ENGLISH.**

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Orders to be observed by the officers of the troops destined for the expedition to be undertaken for the expulsion of the foreigners that have intruded upon the territories of His Majesty in the provinces of Saint Augustine in Florida, under command of Colonel Don Juan Bautista de Echevarria, appointed as commanding general for its duration, in respect not only of regular operations, but also of the orderly conduct of the march.

1. They will obey with the greatest punctuality and accuracy all and any orders whether written or oral, all applying the most particular attention to discipline, and to the good condition of the unit committed to their care. Whenever the case calls for it, they will display the constancy and fortitude, corresponding to their obligations and to the honor and glory of the arms of the King.

2. All the small vessels told off to the expedition which is to pass through the channels, will proceed with the troops and officers assigned to each under the orders of the commanding general; the total number will be divided into four parts or squadrons each with its designated chief.

3. Whenever the commanding general shall hoist a signal, the chiefs of squadrons will at once hoist the same by way of answer; as soon as the signal is hauled down, the others will follow suit successively, to show that the signal has been understood.

4. When the formation is single line abreast, the post of each chief of squadron will be in front of his squadron; in forming four lines in four ranks, on the right; in column of four or more abreast, at the head, and on the right, of the first file of his squadron; in forming single line abreast with the four squadrons, he will occupy the proper post by the side of the last vessel of the squadron he is following, keeping the remainder of his vessels on his left flank, all of which will proceed to their proper places in succession on the flank of their commander, and preserving in all

movements their place and distance, whether under way, at anchor, or moored.

5. Every commanding officer of a vessel must observe with care all the signals whether day or night, made by his immediate chief, and included in the list which each for better understanding will have with him: he will without delay execute the import of said signals.

6. Each commanding officer of a vessel will divide his crew into two watches, which will be on both by day and by night; the watch will be relieved every four hours; dog watches will be stood between 4 and 8 of the evening, in order to share fatigue and rest. Two sentries will be left continuously posted, one in the bow, the other in the stern, with orders to keep a sharp lookout in all directions, for people ashore, signal fires or boats; they shall carefully observe the signals made by their immediate commander, and communicate them at once to the sergeant or corporal of the guard, and the latter to his officer, for suitable action.

7. Each commanding officer of a vessel will give severe orders to maintain the deepest silence by night and by day, and that no one discharge a fire arm without orders; in no case will anyone be allowed to smoke\* by night.

8. Each time that a signal is made to go ashore to cook, the master of the vessel will take off only the number absolutely necessary for the purpose, that is, will detail a number sufficient to act as guard. No one else will be allowed ashore. As soon as the food is cooked, he will order it carried on board, in order that all may eat. He will do the same in respect of going ashore for water; and see to it that his people do not mingle with those of other boats, and that the business in hand shall be carried on as near his boat as possible, in order that his people may promptly go on board, should necessity require it.

9. The armed party that goes ashore to act as guard, will post itself as strongly as possible covering the watering or cooking party, in such a way as to command the approaches and so prevent any sudden attack.

10. Whenever the flagship signals to head inshore and disembark for any purpose, each commander of a vessel will so order the landing that as it progresses, his men shall, if the nature of the ground permit, form four in front and three deep; and if it should not permit, eight or more in

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\* *Chupar tabaco*, a quaint expression, literally to "suck tobacco."

front, according to circumstances, marching at the same time on one line to occupy sufficient ground for the formation of the entire body under his orders. This movement concluded, he will halt and await orders.

11. Each commanding officer of a vessel will at dawn cause his sails to be furled and remain under bare poles; he will send a man aloft to look around for signs or people ashore, signal fires or boats; and will communicate his discoveries by proper signal.

12. Only the commanding general will fly by day a blue pennant, which he will cause to be lowered whenever he wishes to make a signal.

13. Whenever the commanding general shall set a signal he will keep it flying until he is satisfied that the squadron commanders understand it. This will be signified to him by their using the same signal in answer; when the commanding general hauls down his signal, the squadron commanders will do the same, it being understood that no one shall fly a flag, unless ordered, or necessary for signalling as prearranged.

14. Whenever the commanding general shall make the signal for general disembarkation, each commanding officer of a vessel shall at once obey it, leaving on board only two soldiers as a guard, and the sailors, ordering them under no circumstances to leave the position in which ordered to remain.

15. Each commander of a vessel on discovering any people ashore, boats, or fires will at once inform his squadron commander by suitable signal, and keep his signal up until said commander answers by the same: in all cases this procedure will indicate that signals have been understood.

16. Each squadron commander, on receiving a signal from any vessel of his squadron, will determine its meaning, and then answering with the same, will keep it flying until the commanding general shall have made suitable acknowledgement.

17. The commanding general on receiving a signal from a squadron commander will acknowledge with the same, after he has made out the cause, and will give such orders as he deems proper.

18. The commanding general will, whenever the nature of the channels to be navigated permit it, adopt the formation in column four abreast, or anchor in this order, as best lending itself with least confusion to all other maneuvers



demande by circumstances. He will order the galliots to precede the entire fleet, the other boats to follow in order, so as to be on hand for such action as offers.

19. Each commanding officer of a vessel, besides observing orders given, shall constantly maintain himself near the flagship, so as to hear promptly whenever hailed by it either by voice or speaking trumpet to draw near in order to receive orders. These will be at once executed. To this end, each commanding officer will take turn on guard; so that if nothing material comes up, the captain of the guard-boat will at 11 of the morning, the hour at which the orders must be given, go on board the flagship to receive the countersign and parole, and will then proceed to communicate it to all the squadron commanders and captains, so that if at night some vessel not of the convoy, or some hostile vessel should be met, that fact may be recognized by its failure to give the countersign and parole when challenged. Should this happen and be verified, suitable action will be taken. If the guard boat should, when needed, be on duty elsewhere, the next boat on the roster will come up when hailed by the flagship, so that the commanding general may always have some one to distribute any orders he may wish to give.

Juan Francisco de Guemes y Horcasitas.

Havana, March, 1738.

LIST OF NAVAL SIGNALS, AND VARIOUS DIRECTIONS,  
FOR THE EXPEDITION AGAINST GEORGIA.

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Signals to be made by night by the Commanding General and obeyed by Commanding Officers of Squadron and Ships.

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- |   |  |
|---|--|
| A light astern and one in the bow.  | 1. Hoist anchor and get under way forming front with the entire fleet.             |
| Two lights astern.  | 2. Hoist anchor and get under way each squadron in four ranks.                     |
| Light astern.   | 3. Hoist anchor and get under way in column of four abreast.                       |
| Light in the foretop for the first and light in the bow for the second.     | 4. Hoist anchor and sail in column, two abreast, or in single file, bow and stern. |
| Light astern and one in the bow.  | 5. Anchor with the fleet in a single line.   |
| Two lights astern.  | 6. Anchor each squadron in four ranks.   |
| Light astern.   | 7. Anchor in column, four abreast.   |
| Light in the foretop for the first case, and one in the bow for the second. | 8. Anchor in column, two abreast, or in single file, bow and stern.                |

Light to port and another to starboard. 9. Go ashore and cook.

The same signal aloft, adding another light in the bow. 10. Each man to go aboard his ship.

Light in the main top, another in the foretop and one on the bow. 11. Everybody to go ashore.

Light in the main top, another in the foretop. 12. The people of the first and second squadrons, and no more, to go ashore reckoning the commanding general's as the first.

Light in the foretop and another in the bow. 13. The people of the second and third squadrons to go ashore.

Light at half mainmast and another at half foremast. 14. People of the third and fourth squadrons to go ashore.

Light at half mainmast. 15. Half the people of each boat to go ashore.

Light at half foremast. 16. A fourth of the people of each boat to go ashore.

Three gun flashes if to the westward and two if to eastward. 17. To give notice that there are people or a noise ashore.

To show a light three times at the bow, giving sufficient time between appearances to allow them to be distinctly counted. 19. To give notice of one or of many boats.

Light in the bow.

20. Whenever the commanding officer of a vessel gives notice that he needs something, or reports something unforeseen or unprovided for aboard his ship.

Light astern and three gun flashes.

21. To give notice that a hostile ship has been encountered and captured.

Light astern and four gun flashes.

22. To give news that a hostile ship has been encountered and has escaped.

A swivel-gun shot and a light in the main top.

23. All the ships will go to quarters.

A light in the main top and three rounds from a swivel-gun shots.

24. All the vessels will fire their swivel-guns against their antagonists whether ashore or afloat.

Light in the main top and three swivel-gun shots.

25. All the vessels will open with their swivel-guns and small arms.

*Note—*

It should be noticed that this order deals only with vessels having the enemy in their front or on their flanks and not embarrassed by such others of their own ships as might be ahead; because if it should be impossible, as it may, for all our ships to extend their front against the enemy and thus perhaps be unable to fire all at the same time as intended by this order, then only those will open that have a clear field of fire in front, or are so situated that they can fire without embarrassing one another, so that the fire may be opportune and useful and all confusion and danger avoided, for these could easily occur in our own fleet unless these precautions were taken.

Two lights on the mainmast, one about a yard below the other.

2. To go about whether under sail or under oars.

*Note—*

It should be noticed that this maneuver must be carried out so that the vessels of the second file shall go about after having occupied the place in which the flagship or its file and vanguard went about; the third file will do the same where the second went about; the fourth where the third and the movement will be carried out in this fashion until the rear guard is reached; one succeeding the other in the same order and distance so that after all the vessels shall have tacked, the fleet will remain in the same formation as before.

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**Day Signals to be made by the Commanding General and obeyed by the Commanding Officers of Squadron and Ships.**

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|--|--|
| The Spanish ensign in the bow and the pennant of Spain in the mainmast.  | 1. Hoist anchor and get under way forming front with the whole fleet.                      |
| Ensign of Spain in the bow and the same pennant in the foretop.  | 2. Hoist anchor and get under way in column, four abreast.                                 |
| Standard of Spain in the bow and the pennant at half mainmast.   | 3. Hoist anchor and get under way in column, four abreast.                                 |
| Ensign of Spain in the bow and the pennant at half foremast in the first case; and in the second the ensign of Spain in the foretop. | 4. Hoist anchor and get under way in column, two abreast, or in single file, bow to stern. |
| Ensign of Spain in the bow and pennant of Spain in the maintop.  | 5. Anchor in single line of the whole fleet.   |
| Ensign of Spain in the bow and the same pennant in the foretop.  | 6. Anchor, each squadron in four ranks.  |

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| Ensign of Spain in the bow and the pennant at half mainmast.  | 7. Anchor in column, four abreast.   |
| Ensign of Spain in the bow and pennant at half foremast for the first case; and for the second, ensign of Spain in the foretop. | 8. Anchor in column, two abreast, or in single file, bow to stern.   |
| Ensign of Spain in the maintop.   | 9. Go ashore to cook.  |
| Ensign of Spain in stops in the bow and blue pennant in the maintop.  | 10. Each man to return to his ship.  |
| Blue pennant in the foretop.  | 11. Go ashore for water.   |
| The same blue pennant at half mainmast.   | 12. Each man to return to his ship.  |
| Ensign of Spain in the bow and red pennant in the maintop.  | 13. All ships will display their ensigns in the bow.   |
| Ensign of Spain in the maintop and pennant of Spain in the foretop.   | 14. Everybody ashore.  |
| Ensign of Spain in the maintop and blue pennant in the foretop.   | 15. The people of the first and second squadrons, and no more, to go ashore, reckoning the commanding general's as the first; the people of the remaining squadrons not to stir. |
| Ensign of Spain in the maintop and blue pennant in the foretop.   | 16. The people of the second and third squadrons, and no more, to go ashore.   |
| Ensign of Spain in the foretop and Spanish pennant in the maintop.  | 17. The people of the third and fourth squadrons, and no more, to go ashore.   |



Ensign of Spain at half mainmast and Spanish pennant at half foremast.

Ensign of Spain at half mainmast.

The ensign of Spain in stops at the stern and the bow set or pointing to the place where the people were seen, and so kept until the flagship answers with the same signal which will be, when it will have picked up the said people.

Spanish ensign in stops in the maintop and the bow pointing where fire was seen and to remain in this fashion until the flagship answers with the same signal.

Ensign of Spain in stops in the bow, this pointing where the ships were seen and the said stopped flag hoisted and lowered as many times as there were boats seen, with a sufficient interval to give opportunity to distinguish them.

Ensign of Spain in the bow, hoisted and lowered three times and the commanding officer of the squadron will answer in the same way informing the commanding general, who will take the proper action.

18. Half the people of each ship, and no more, to go ashore.

19. A quarter of the people on each ship, and no more, ashore.

20. To give notice of having seen people ashore.

21. To give notice of some fire ashore.

22. To give notice of one or of many vessels seen.

23. Whenever the commanding officer of a vessel gives notice that he needs something or reports something unforeseen or unprovided for aboard his ship.

- Ensign of Spain in the bow and red pennant in the foretop. 24. All ships whether under sail or at anchor will go to quarters.
- Ensign of Spain in the bow and the red pennant in the maintop. 25. All vessels to open fire with their swivel-guns on their antagonists whether afloat or ashore.
- Ensign of Spain in the bow, red pennant in the maintop and another Spanish pennant in the foretop. 26. All vessels will open fire with their swivel-guns and muskets at one and the same time.

*Note—*

It should be noticed that this order deals only with vessels having the enemy in their front or on their flanks and not embarrassed by such others of their own ships as might be ahead; because if it should be impossible, as it may, for all our ships to extend their front against the enemy and thus perhaps be unable to fire all at the same time, as intended by this order, then only those will open that have a clear field of fire in front, or are so situated that they can fire without embarrassing one another, so that the fire may be opportune and useful and all confusion and danger avoided, for these could easily occur in our own fleet unless these precautions were taken.

- Spanish pennant in the maintop. 27. To go about whether under sail or under oars.

*Note—*

It should be noticed that this maneuver must be carried out so that the vessels of the second file shall go about after having occupied the place in which the flagship or its file and vanguard went about; the third file will do the same where the second went about; the fourth where the third; and the movement will be carried out in this fashion until the rear guard is reached; one succeeding the other in the same order and distance so that after all the vessels shall have tacked, the fleet will remain in the same formation as before.

Day and Night Signals which the Commanding General of the Expedition will Order to be made on the Coast and in the Places Indicated, to Maintain the Union and Co-operation Required and Provided for in the Instructions on the Journey and During the Operations of Both Fleets.

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A fire on the beach.

1. In order that the commanding officer of the sea squadron may know where the interior flotilla happens to be, let him either lie-to or anchor.

Two fires on the beach, a quarter of a mile apart.

2. The said commanding officer will put to sea and continue his voyage.

One fire in the place indicated and eight or ten flashes of powder at intervals.

3. Order the disembarkation of the troops designated upon the beach of the Island of St. Simon, get under way and capture the port of Gualquini, according to previous instructions.

Two fires on the same beach already mentioned, the same flashes and a few musket shots at the same time.

4. Order the disembarkation of the troops on the beach of the said island, get under way, capture the port as soon as this signal is received, without waiting for any other.

## SUPPLIES

Length of 3 in. rope

10 Bolts

Small Tools

2 Jack Screws

Return which gives Ships of War, Transports, Staff Officers, Troops, Militia, Rations, Ammunition, Arms and Tools, for the River Service and to leave in reserve in Florida, destined for the Expedition which is directed from the port of Havana for operations in the Royal Service in the Provinces of Florida; as follows:

Three fires on the beach at a distance of a quarter of a mile, one from the other.

5. The armed bilanders to get under way, enter the Bay of St. Simon so as to co-operate with the disembarkation of the troops, told off for this purpose, on the beach of the south point; the ships to remain at anchor outside, as already decided.

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#### Signals of Recognition by Day or Night.

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Whenever the commanding general sends a boat or launch to speak to the commanding officer of the sea squadron, if it should be day, he will carry a Spanish flag in his bow and fire a blank cartridge from his swivel-gun. To this, answer will be made with a Spanish flag in the stern, by clewing up the mainsail and foresail, lowering and hoisting the main topsails, and by bracing the foretopsail, lying-to and waiting. If it should be night, he will show a light in his bow and fire three blank rounds from a swivel-gun and the answering signal will be a light in the stern, another in the bow, and lying-to to wait.

Whenever the commanding officer of the sea squadron shall send a boat or launch to speak to the commanding general if it be day, he will carry the Spanish ensign in his bow and when near enough, will fire five musket shots. The answering signal will be to lower the distinguishing pennant, to place the ensign in the bow and fire five musket shots. If it be by night, he will show a light in his bow, and challenged "Who goes there?" will answer "Philip the Fifth and Havana." The answering signal will be a light in the stern, and as many other musket rounds, and on receiving the same challenge, the answer, "Spain and Cuba."



## NOTE ON THE BATTLE GROUND OF BLOODY MARSH.

By Otis Ashmore.

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The battle in which Oglethorpe defeated Montiano on St. Simon's Island is known locally as the Battle of Bloody Marsh and the exact site of this engagement has long been in much doubt.


In the summer of 1912, accompanied by Lawton B. Evans, C. B. Gibson, Col. Charles M. Snelling, and L. B. Robeson, I made a visit to St. Simon Island for the purpose of identifying if possible the exact location of the battlefield. Every account of the battle had been carefully studied, including that of Montiano himself, from translations furnished by Lieut. Col. C. DeW. Willcox, U. S. A., professor at the United States Military Academy.

In the light of all these accounts, and after going over the ground very carefully, there seems to be no doubt that this memorable battle was fought at a point upon the margin of the marsh about two miles from the south end of the island, and about one mile from the hotel, where the road from Gascoigne's Bluff enters the road to Frederica. This spot agrees perfectly with the account of Capt Thomas Spalding,\* which for many obvious reasons is by far the clearest and the most trustworthy. A sketch of the island and of the battle ground itself, made at the time of my visit, will make more clear Spalding's graphic account, and will show all the strategic points in the campaign more satisfactorily than any verbal description could do.

It is, perhaps, needless to say that with the exception of the causeway, which still exists, and the crescent shaped woodland so well described by Spalding, not a vestige of this tragic episode remains. No trace of the road around the crescent could be found, as this circuitous pathway has long since been abandoned for the more direct road across it.

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\* See account of this battle by Capt. Thomas Spalding in Vol. I. Ga. Hist. Society Collections.



BATTLE GROUND OF BLOODY MARSH.

A-B the Ambuscade.



St. Simons Island and Frederica




The traditions of the people living upon the island all agree that the marsh just east of the causeway is the true battle ground of Bloody Marsh.

There is scarcely a doubt that the ambushade was laid at the two points of the crescent woodland where the road from Gascoigne's Bluff enters the main road to Frederica, and that the Spaniards were entrapped in the curved roadway around this crescent. In their confusion the Spaniards attempted to retreat along the road over the causeway, but when they were met by the claymores of the Highlanders, they were forced into the marsh just east of the causeway where much of the execution took place.









*Return which embraces the ships, their names, their Captains, the number of the crew & troops; the kinds of 242,200 ordinary rations; the 189,700 rations for 105 days; the 45,200 for 500 recruits that ought to be taken corresponding to 85 ration days, and likewise 14,532 rations for sick and wounded; Artillery; Stores; Ammunition, and other utensils, &c.*

NAMES OF SHIPS	NAMES OF THE CAPTAINS	STRENGTH		Total	Hundredweights of Kinds of Rations										Food for Sick and Wounded				Hundredweights of			Quarter Casks with Wooden Hoops	Barrels with same	Barrels with Iron Hoops																		
		Crew	Troops		Hard Bread	Salt Beef	Bacon	Fine Provisions	Common Provisions	Rice	Fire Wood	Pecks of Salt	Small Jars of Butter	Pounds of Tallow Fat Candles	Chickens	Eggs	Hard Tack	Cigars	Charcoal																							
Frigates																																										
R	S <sup>a</sup> Theresa	Don Anto. Castañeda	140	40	180	2,722 05	1,210	102 05	151 25	151 66	101 4	1,630	242	2,145	1,528	1,500	400	101 05	14 6	60	65	63	17																			
R	La Prudente Sara	" Nicolás Landa	20	108	128	Barrels with iron hoops (diff size)	Hogsheads with same	Pitchers narrow bottoms	Round Jars	Pumps	Quart Measures	Wood Stoves	Cook's tripods	Iron Pots	Copper Kettles	Copper Spoons	Wooden Plates	Scales Steel and Wooden	Sets of Weights up to 6 pounds	Tin	Wooden	Sailors' Hemmocks	Casks of Vinegar or bottles																			
R	S <sup>a</sup> Mathéo	" Antonio Villena	20	54	74																																					
R	La Plectin	" Urrutia	20	84	104																																					
R	La Santa Familia	" Manuel de Viera	28	110	138																																					
R	S <sup>a</sup> Ant <sup>a</sup> las Animas	" Xpitol <sup>a</sup> Tabon	12	74	86	19	77	21	72	12	61	22	24	11	40	30	125	20	20	2	12	1,029	1																			
R	San Joseph	Pablo Rodriguez	13	54	66																																					
Pinks																																										
R	S <sup>a</sup> Lorenzo	" Francisco Villesilla	20	63	83	BRONZE CANNON	GUN CARRIAGES	SHEARS																																		
R						20 pounders	16 pounders	Decorated	Spare (in reserve)	Spare	With Block and Tackle	Frame for raising carriages, etc.	Platforms																													
Packet																																										
R	El Diligente	" Pedro Garzaicocha	110	110		2	4	6	1	1	1	6	400	800	30	150	100	150	60,217	6-12	4	2																				
Galley																																										
R	S <sup>a</sup> Ysabel	" Domingo de la Cruz	100	100		Lanyards	Gunnery's Ladders	Ramrods	Swabs	Crowbars	Hand Grenades	Bombs	Powder	Fuses	Iron	Tallow	To 8	Pitch	Artillery Pelleys	Sights	Guns with Bayonets	Plints	Hand Spikes																			
R						4	4	4	4	10	41 996	5 50	250	7	4	6	4	3	8	600	3,400	100																				
Sloops																																										
R	San Joseph	" Pedro Truxillo	10	70	80																																					
	Divina Pastora	" Miguel Fonaris	10	52	62	Machetes (long knives)	Boarding Pikes	Pikes	Shovels	Spades	Axes	Tubs for Firearms	Sand Bags	Knapsacks	Ladders	Tents	Purge with parts	Strips of Hemp 3' m.	BOARDS FOR Artillery	PLATFORMS Heavy and Medium	BOARDS Ordinary	60 gals. casks of Pitch																				
	S <sup>a</sup> Judas Thadeo	" Joachin Pérez	4	32	40																																					
	La Rosa	" Pedro la Madrid	5	24	32																																					
	S <sup>a</sup> Joseph y Las Animas	" Marcos Torres	8	24	32																																					
	S <sup>a</sup> Joseph, alias Facalera	" Francisco Gonzales	10	62	72																																					
	N <sup>a</sup> S <sup>a</sup> de la Merced	" Juan Fran <sup>co</sup> Oyarvil	10	62	72																																					
	Jesus Navarro	" Diego de Moya	8	14	22																																					
	El Canto	" Pedro Lorezo	8	44	52																																					
	La Gran Bestia	" Francisco Camejo	10	52	62																																					
	La Rebecca	" Pedro Romero	5	10	15																																					
R	La Soledad y la Rosa	" Manuel Allende	5	12	20																																					
Schooners																																										
	La Santissima Trinidad	" Pedro de Avila	18	54	72	LAMPs																																				
	N <sup>a</sup> S <sup>a</sup> del Carmen	" Fernando Antonio	6	26	32	Lanterns	Running Lights	Dark Lanterns	Padlocks	Bags made of Palm Leaves	Sisal Hemp	Rough Canvas	Small Bags of Rough Canvas	Bundles of Majagua Yarn	Undressed Sheepskins																											
	Las S <sup>a</sup> Trin <sup>a</sup> y las Animas	" Baphael Francisco	5	26	31																																					
	La Candelaria	" Marcos Fernández	5	12	17																																					
	Los Dolores	" Ignacio Amaro	5	26	31																																					
	San Raphael	" Francisco Gil	5	26	31																																					
	San Antonio	" Domingo Valas	4	13	17																																					
	La Santissima Trinidad	" Juan Palomares	4	12	16																																					
	N <sup>a</sup> S <sup>a</sup> de los Dolores	" Estevan Guzmán	15	52	67																																					
Launches																																										
						600	12	150	8	12	4	1	12	20	20	17	50	6	2	50	6	24	29 5																			
Lauches																																										
R	La del Inevitable	" Manuel de Aranda	8	5	13																																					
R	La del R <sup>a</sup> Astillero	" Joseph de Aranda	5	5	10																																					
33 SHIPS																																										
			674	1,312	2,016	1	25	3	3	2	2	15	3	2	100	10	12	2	30	1	1	4	2																			

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






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